Infantry

January-February 2006

Finding the Enemy

Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Targeting

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course --
Past and Present (Page 10)
Know Your Beat: National Guard Unit Conducts
Long Range Surveillance in Iraq (Page 14)

FRONT COVER:

Staff Sergeant Jacob Sprenger and Private First Class Dewayne White, both from the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, provide security at a vehicle checkpoint January 4 in Hawijah, Iraq. (Photo by Specialist Timothy Kingston)

BACK COVER:

Staff Sergeant Daniel Fields and Private Jeman Gaddi of the 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry Regiment, provide security January 3 during a patrol in Rawah, Iraq. (Photo by Lance Corporal Shane S. Keller, USMC)

Infantry

Commandant's Note

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

FINDING THE TERRORIST: Locating the Enemy

To destroy terrorists we must first *find* them; that is what I want to highlight in this Commandant's Note. The contemporary operating environment (COE) may well represent the face of war into the next decade. When we consider the nature of the global war on terror — its asymmetrical quality, diverse groups of enemy fighters employing hit-and-run tactics, and their ability to operate in terrain ranging from mountains to major urban centers — we realize that unconventional warfare has become the way we fight today. In addition, special operations forces now more than ever share the battlefield with the combined arms team and with our sister services. Each force brings its own unique skills and lethality to the fight. The operational tempo of the COE demands faster and more adaptive forces than ever before.

Since the Saddamist and Taliban forces were defeated and scattered in the opening battles of this war, they — along with Al Qaeda and other terrorist factions — are now fighting in smaller cells. Today's insurgents employ their own tactics, techniques, and procedures; some learned from various outside terrorist organizations and bordering countries who support them; or the hard way, by combat trial and error against U.S. and allied forces. Meanwhile, we also continually develop and refine our tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter terrorists' methods and get inside their decision cycle.

In this environment, *finding* the enemy is critical. It is a critical mission of the reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition battalions in our modular structure, as well as an inherent mission for every Soldier on the battlefield. Ultimately, the destruction of the enemy depends on how well all of our formations execute the *find* mission, and we need to make *finding* an all-out effort. By the end of FY 2007, nearly a third of our maneuver battalions will have *finding* the enemy as their primary mission. This expanded reconnaissance, surveillance, and collection effort will mean greater contact with the host nation population, and a commensurate increase in the human intelligence input required for success.

An important part of this effort is cultural awareness and our ability to understand the social, economic, and religious routine and habits of the local community. It will reveal patterns of movement, the daily cycle of activity, key individuals that drift in and out of our field of vision, and changes that can alert us to potential danger. Foreign language skills are a factor here; leaders need to identify Soldiers even marginally fluent in the native language and draw on their talents. Interpreters in units can assist in sharpening our Soldiers' abilities to pick up key words related to tactics, explosives, and weapons. We cannot make every Soldier an Arabic, Kurdish, or Pashto linguist, but picking IED trends or other threats out of street conversations can lead to success. Linking the analysis of all these sources together and identifying targets is a top priority.

Training Soldiers and leaders to *find* the enemy is a priority at the Infantry School. The Ranger Training Brigade is continuing to update the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC) with emphasis on the *find* mission. RSLC has expanded courses on imagery collection and transmission, focusing on small unmanned aerial vehicle employment and using tactical surveillance equipment camera kits. More training is now done on uniforms, munitions, and foreign alphabet training. Based on input out of Iraq and Afghanistan, target interdiction and sniper employment have also been added to the POI. The 4th Ranger Training Battalion has assisted in the predeployment training of National Guard Soldiers in long range surveillance units and will provide mobile training team and observer/controller support to assist units in matters of modularity, transformation, and predeployment activities.

The Infantry Center is not alone in enhancing our skills at *finding* the terrorist. The Armor School has expanded its officer education system to include reconnaissance-centric training and is focusing on reconnaissance operations tactics, techniques, and procedures in its Cavalry Leaders Course and the Scout Leaders Course. These and other initiatives will enhance and advance our *find* effort as the Armor and Infantry Centers join ranks as the Maneuver Center of Excellence in the near future.

Finding the terrorist where he plans and operates has never been easy, but we are doing it. Up to now the enemy has gained temporary advantage by immersing himself among a tolerant population in which he hides, refits, rearms, and recruits, and from which he attacks. We must disrupt this pattern at every opportunity. We need to be there when he sets up his ambush, when he emplaces an improvised explosive device, or when he gets behind the wheel of a vehicle packed with explosives. We need to know his meeting places, his routes to them, who meets with him, where they live, and where and from whom he gets his support. Once we have achieved this, we can kill or capture him and his accomplices before they can commit further terrorist acts. We will continue to do our part in training Soldiers for this critical mission.

Follow me!

Infantry News

New Device Will Sense Through Concrete Walls

DONNA MILES

Troops conducting urban operations soon will have the capabilities of superheroes, being able to sense through 12 inches of concrete to determine if someone is inside a building.

The new "Radar Scope" will give warfighters searching a building the ability to tell within seconds if someone is in the next room, said Edward Baranoski from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA's) Special Projects Office.

By simply holding the portable, handheld device up to a wall, users will be able to detect movements as small as breathing, he said.

The Radar Scope, developed by DARPA, is expected to be fielded to troops in Iraq as soon as this spring, Baranoski said. The device is likely to be fielded to the squad level, for use by troops going door to door in search of terrorists.

The Radar Scope will give warfighters the capability to sense through a foot of concrete and 50 feet beyond that into a room, Baranoski explained.

It will bring to the fight what larger, commercially available motion detectors couldn't, he said. Weighing just a pound and a half, the Radar Scope will be about the size of a telephone handset and cost just about $1,000, making it light enough for a Soldier to carry and inexpensive enough to be fielded widely.

The Radar Scope will be waterproof and rugged, and will run on AA batteries, he said.

"It may not change how four-man stacks go into a room (during clearing operations)," Baranoski said. "But as they go into a building, it can help them prioritize what rooms they go into. It will give them an extra degree of knowledge so they know if someone is inside."

Even as the organization hurries to get the devices to combat forces, DARPA already is laying groundwork for bigger plans that build on this technology.

Proposals are expected this week for the new "Visi Building" technology that's more

DARPA expects the portable Radar Scope to look similar to this model.

than a motion detector. It will actually "see" through multiple walls, penetrating entire buildings to show floor plans, locations of occupants, and placement of materials such as weapons caches, Baranoski said.

"It will give (troops) a lot of opportunity to stake out buildings and really see inside," he said. "It will go a long way in extending their surveillance capabilities."

The device is expected to take several years to develop. Ultimately, servicemembers will be able to use it simply by driving or flying by the structure under surveillance, Baranoski said. *(Donna Miles writes for the American Forces Press Service.)*

REUNIONS

The **Society of the First Infantry Division** will hold its 88th annual reunion July 12-16, 2006, in Phoenix at the Arizona Biltmore.

For more information, visit the society's Web site (www.1stID.org) or contact the society at:

Society of the First Infantry Division
1933 Morris Road, Blue Bell, PA 19422
(888) 324-4733; fax: (215) 661-1934;
e-mail: Soc1ID@aol.com

The **45th Infantry Division (Thunderbirds)** will hold its annual reunion September 28 to October 1, 2006.

For more information, contact Raul Trevino at:
2145 NE Street, Oklahoma City, OK 73111
(210) 681-9134

Soldiers testing cooling vests in Iraq — About 500 liquid-filled cooling vests are now being tested by HMMWV crews in Iraq and Kuwait.

The vests are worn under body armor and a hose from each vest is plugged into the HMMWV's on-board air-conditioning system. Liquid from the vehicle's AC system circulates through the vest, cooling its wearer.

The vests were developed by the Army's Tank Automotive Research, Development & Engineering Center (TARDEC),

The vests fit under a Soldier's normal body armor and are connected via hoses to the vehicle's air-conditioning system.

in coordination with the Natick Soldier Center. They were sent to Kuwait this past summer and then forwarded to Iraq.

The HMMWVs with add-on armor were fitted with air conditioners after TARDEC engineers in Warren, Michigan, were given the requirement to figure out how Soldiers in armored vehicles could be kept cool under the desert sun.

Some of the same engineers had designed the add-on armor kits for the M-998 and M-1025 HMMWVs in theater. But with the extra armor and doors closed, temperatures inside the vehicles could reportedly reach more than 130 degrees.

About 21,000 of the air-conditioning systems have been ordered for HMMWVs in theater and more than 13,750 already have the AC systems installed, Bussee said. But even with air conditioning, temperatures inside the armored vehicles could still reach 95 degrees in the sun, Bussee said. So something more was needed.

Each HMMWV cooling kit consists of four water-filled vests known as Air Warrior Microclimatic Cooling Garments or MCGs. Fungicide-treated water is chilled by the AC system in the HMMWV and circulated through the garment.

A rapid-release system allows Soldiers to quickly disconnect the hoses so they can jump out of the vehicle and keep the vests on. *(Adapted from an Army News Service release by Gary Sheftick.)*

Caffeine gum now in Army supply channels — The Army recently finished testing "Stay Alert" caffeine gum as a countermeasure for fatigue, and the new product is now available through military supply channels.

The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) tested the new gum.

"We wanted to show that the gum is a quick and safe method of maintaining or improving alertness and physical and mental performance, and our tests did that," said Dr. Gary Kamimori of the Department of Behavioral Biology at WRAIR.

Each piece of Stay Alert chewing gum contains 100 milligrams of caffeine, which is about the amount found in a six-ounce cup of coffee.

"Because it's chewed, it delivers caffeine to the body four to five times faster than a liquid or pill because it's absorbed through tissues in the mouth — not the gut, like in traditional formulations," Kamimori said.

A sleep researcher, he learned of the idea of delivering caffeine through gum in 1998. Congress funded the first study on the gum a year later. When the study validated how fast the caffeine was absorbed in the body, the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, the parent command of WRAIR, began developing and testing Stay Alert for use in sustained or continuous military operations when Soldiers typically don't get enough sleep.

WRAIR researchers have also conducted studies with colleagues from Defence Research and Development Canada–Toronto and the New Zealand Defense Forces, with promising results, Kamimori said.

"In three studies, using multiple administrations of caffeine with Stay Alert gum, they (Soldiers) reported that alertness, marksmanship — both simulated and live fire — vigilance on observation and reconnaissance tasks and physical performance during simulated operations were either maintained or improved as compared to those Soldiers who received a placebo chewing gum," he said.

The Department of Defense Combat Feeding Program of the Natick Soldier Center in Massachusetts also tested and approved the gum to become a component of the experimental "First Strike Ration." The lightweight ration is designed for Special Operations Forces. Three hundred cases of the Stay Alert gum went to Soldiers in the field in 2004. Stay Alert has a National Stock Number (NSN #8925-01-530-1219). *(Adapted from a USAMRMC release by Karen Fleming-Michael.)*

2006 Warfighting Conference

The 2006 Warfighting Conference is tentatively scheduled for September 11-14.
Once available, conference information such as agendas and reservation information will be posted to the Fort Benning Web site at https://www.benning.army.mil. Additional information about the conference will also appear in upcoming issues of *Infantry* Magazine.

STRYKER RESET: How Can TRADOC Assist?

MAJOR ANTHONY BENITEZ

As the Army continues to transform into a modular force and unit life cycles start to take shape, there are a variety of challenges that units need to address, none more so than the challenge of unit reset. As units complete successful deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq, they are quickly faced with the reality that a significant amount of leadership experience and technical knowledge will be lost as 75-80 percent of the Soldiers depart the unit as their life cycle terms expire. Shortly thereafter, units receive an influx of new Soldiers with varying backgrounds — light, heavy, airborne and, now, Stryker. In the case of Stryker units, however, the likelihood of receiving a Soldier with previous Stryker experience, particularly in the case of senior NCOs and officers, is remote. This creates a need that is specific to Stryker units during their reset period — a need for TRADOC to provide Stryker leader conversion training, new equipment training teams/mobile training teams (NETTs/MTTs), and institutional programs of instruction (POIs) designed to introduce officers and NCOs to Stryker-related doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Leader Conversion Training

(See July-August 2005 issue of *Infantry* Magazine for more details.)

Currently, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) Transformation Team (STT) at Fort Benning, a subordinate element of the TRADOC Futures Center, is the enabling force behind the Leader Conversion Training Program (LCTP). LCTP events provide a doctrinal base that enables leaders to understand and to employ SBCT capabilities. In its current form, LCTP consists of three elements:

1) **University** – a three-day information, orientation, and education event that provides an overarching view of what is unique to a SBCT;

2) **Senior Leaders Course** (SLC) – a 10-day course that supports the SBCT commander's leader development program focused on the brigade and battalion staffs;

3) **Tactical Leaders Course** (TLC) – a seven-day event designed to teach junior SBCT leadership how SBCT units fight, again supporting the SBCT commander's leader development program at the company/platoon level. Originally intended to provide a doctrinal foundation for new Stryker formations, the LCTP enhanced the successful transformation of three Stryker brigades deployed to Iraq in support of OIF (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division [SBCT 1], 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division [SBCT 2] and 172nd Infantry Brigade [SBCT 3]). These units performed, and in the case of 172nd IN (SBCT 3), are performing admirably in theater as they apply the doctrine taught to them.

As the first unit to tackle reset, 3/2 IN (SBCT 1) did so with approximately 80 percent of the leadership in the ranks of E-7 and above remaining in the unit. So, given that the vast majority of those personnel had taken part in leader conversion training, there was not a specified need for another iteration of the LCTP. For 3/2 IN (SBCT 1), the doctrinal foundation and the ability to train incoming personnel were already in place. SBCT 1's reset, however, was an anomaly in that a majority of the leadership held in place. For future SBCTs, however, they will experience the inverse, as much of the

Photos by Staff Sergeant James L. Harper, Jr.

leadership knowledge leaves with the Soldiers as they PCS upon their return from theater during the unit's reset window (in the case of SBCT 2, approximately 80 percent of the unit will PCS). Given the uniqueness of the unit, the challenges of digitization and the probability of receiving Soldiers and leaders with no Stryker experience, SBCT commanders identified a need for more leader conversion training. The STT has met that need by developing and resourcing another LCTP for unit reset. SBCT 2, the 1/25 IN, is the first Stryker unit to receive this training (currently scheduled to begin in May 2006) and will establish a footprint for future SBCT resets.

NETT/MTTs

Considering that the Stryker brigade is still a relatively new force, officers and NCOs coming into a resetting SBCT face the probability that they will have a steep learning curve when they arrive. In addition, as Stryker units continue to evolve, new equipment and improved digital software continue to be produced to outfit the SBCTs. Therein lies a requirement for Soldiers with Stryker experience who remain with the unit after

redeployment to undergo training on new equipment as it is fielded in the unit; examples of this are the Mortar Carrier B, the M777 lightweight 155mm towed howitzer, the NBC Recon Vehicle and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). To assist in the training of Soldiers who have never served in a Stryker unit and in the training on new systems, the 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment sponsors a NETT that covers the full spectrum of units/personnel that compose the SBCT. Comprised of three E-7s and two E-6s, the 1-29th Infantry NETT works in conjunction with NET teams assigned by other TRADOC institutions (Fort Knox, Fort Sill, Fort Leonard Wood, and Fort Sam Houston) to provide quality assurance and control to the instruction that is given to the SBCT. All instructors are certified through the Instructor Trainers Course at Fort Benning, and the 1-29 Infantry NETT monitors and analyzes instruction given by General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) representatives during the training. Using the 29th Regiment after action review (AAR) format, the NETT provides feedback to instructors in an effort to consistently improve the training. Given that the NET team

develops the POI for the training and members are cross-trained on the different Stryker variants, the NET team can also stand in and teach NET classes, if required.

In an effort to assist the unit in meeting the reset timeline, TRADOC MTTs are extremely effective. Sending out mobile training teams for Sniper, Javelin and combatives, for example, is a tremendous contribution to a unit that potentially loses a vast amount of knowledge in these facets as a result of the reset process (3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division requested all of these MTTs during their reset period; these MTTs were funded by the STT). Visits by TRADOC MTTs provide units an opportunity to get a significant number of individuals trained without incurring the expenses (both in terms of money and time) that would be associated with sending Soldiers to the schoolhouse at Fort Benning. An "expeditionary" TRADOC provides vast experience to resetting units in the areas that they identify and can certainly ease the training burden on the unit. In addition, it allows the Soldiers to stay at home station to continue to integrate with their new unit. Upon completion of MTT training, a train-the-trainer foundation is established, enabling the unit to provide this training expertise to Soldiers throughout the entire SBCT. This has added significance for the infantry lieutenant, as an example, who finds himself responsible for the planning and execution of a cordon and search. The skill set that he has as a result of the initial MTT training (in this case, sniper training) and knowing the capabilities of a sniper team give him the confidence to properly employ snipers/designated marksmen and give his Soldiers the

confidence to close with and defeat the enemy in the close fight.

Institutional Training

In an effort to provide NCOs and officers with a Stryker foundation, the 1-29 IN authored four resident programs of instruction approved by TRADOC. The four POIs consist of the following: Stryker Pre-Command Course, Stryker Leader Course, Stryker Transition Course and Stryker Master Trainer Course. As Soldiers process through these courses, the intent is that they will be better prepared to make immediate contributions technically and tactically to the SBCT they are being assigned to. This is particularly critical for Stryker units experiencing a reset, as a vast majority of knowledge and experience has departed and will need to be adequately replaced.

The Stryker Pre-Command Course is geared for colonels, lieutenant colonels, and command sergeants major assigned to or on orders to a SBCT. This program is designed as a one-week (40 hours) add-on to the existing Infantry Pre-Command Course to prepare commanders and CSMs for their assignments. Its focus is on SBCT-specific issues concerning maintenance, operations, and capabilities. The culminating exercise for this course is a command post exercise (CPX). There are two phases to the course — 40 hours of resident training complemented with a distance learning portion.

The Stryker Leader Course is designed as a stand-alone three-week (120 hours) POI. The course focuses on tasks relating to the SBCT, such as vehicle orientation/maintenance, FBCB2 (Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below) and TADSS (training aids, devices, simulators and simulations), culminating in a situational training exercise (STX). Senior NCOs (E-7 and E-8) and officers (O-1 through O-4) with a branch component of Infantry (11), Field Artillery (13) and Engineer (12) will make up the class demographic. The intent of this course is to provide a solid foundation for Soldiers on orders to a SBCT, thereby easing their transition into the unit.

The Stryker Transition Course consists of NCOs in the rank of sergeant and staff sergeant on orders to a SBCT. The course is designed as a stand-alone, two-week (80 hours) program of instruction. The POI mirrors the first two weeks of the Stryker Leader Course so a Soldier who has completed the transition course will only need to attend the final week of the Stryker Leader Course. The major difference between the courses is that the transition course does not teach Stryker employment with a culminating STX.

To provide NCOs with a graduate-level learning opportunity, 1-29 Infantry created the Stryker Master Trainer Course. Designed for NCOs in the rank of staff sergeant through master sergeant who possess previous experience in Stryker units, this eight-week (320 hours) course trains selected NCOs on basic and advanced marksmanship, maintenance, communications, and training management techniques required for the SBCT. A prerequisite for attendance is previous completion of the Stryker Leader Course or Stryker Transition Course.

In an effort to validate the effectiveness of the POIs, pilot courses must be run first. The next pilot for the Stryker Transition Course was scheduled for January 30 through February 10. Pending equipment receipt and instructor certification, the earliest timeframe

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RESIDENT STRYKER COURSES

Stryker Leader
Length: 3 weeks (120 hrs)
Audience: O-1 thru O-4, E-7 thru E-8
Focus: Vehicle orientation, capabilities, FBCB2 and TADSS; culminates with a STX

Stryker Pre-Command
Length: 1 week (40 hrs)
Audience: O-5 thru O-6, CSMs
Focus: SBCT-specific issues concerning maintenance, operations and capabilities

Stryker Master Trainer
Length: 8 weeks (320 hrs)
Audience: E-6 thru E-8 w/previous Stryker experience
Focus: Advanced marksmanship, maintenance, communications and training management techniques

Stryker Transition
Length: 2 weeks (80 hrs)
Audience: E-5 thru E-6
Focus: Vehicle orientation, capabilities, FBCB2 and TADSS

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to start the Stryker Trainer Course and the Stryker Leader Course would be 3rd Quarter of FY06.

Again, the intent of these courses is to provide officers and NCOs with a solid Stryker foundation upon which to work, thereby making them immediate contributors to their respective units. For a Stryker unit experiencing a significant leadership and knowledge base turnover during reset, this contribution from incoming personnel is critical.

Unit reset is a challenge for any unit, regardless if it's a light, heavy, airborne or Stryker unit. However, given the relative newness of Stryker formations and the impact of life-cycle manning, there are some unique challenges to address to offset the loss of a significant amount of technical and tactical knowledge as a result of reset. To meet the needs of Stryker units, TRADOC is in the process of developing, with the intent of implementing, concepts for leader conversion training, NETT/MTTs and programs of instruction that are Stryker-specific. An "expeditionary" TRADOC allows for resetting units to train a much higher volume of Soldiers than if the unit was forced to send Soldiers to the institution to receive the training. In addition, by introducing more Stryker-specific programs at the institutional level, Soldiers will arrive at their respective units more prepared to tackle the challenges inherent to operating in a new formation. Successful implementation of these concepts should ease the burden of reset on the unit and assist these units in achieving the high standards that previous Soldiers set before them.

Major Anthony Benitez is currently serving on the SBCT Transformation Team at Fort Benning. He is a 1991 graduate of the United States Military Academy. MAJ Benitez most recently served as the executive officer/operations officer of the United Nations Command Security Battalion - Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, Korea from May 2003 to May 2005.

Professional Forum

FINDING THE ENEMY:

BIGGER THAN RECON

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES J. MINGUS

Finding the enemy is infinitely more difficult than killing him. As the late Lieutenant General John Norton used to say, "Very few battles, if any, have ever been lost due to poor maneuver; it is usually due to poor intelligence. If we had perfect intelligence, we could develop the perfect plan." This quote was in the context of a uniformed or organized enemy. Apply this to the modern day contemporary operating environment (COE) and the problem of analyzing and finding our current and future threat is troublesome. Instead of identifying formations, tanks and the regimental artillery group, we are challenged to analyze, dissect and then find cells, groups, counterinsurgents, sympathizers, underground networks, family members, all of which blend perfectly into the civilian populace. We *must* get better at finding him.

I have never been an advocate of fighting the last war, but we can learn from Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. We certainly need to be prepared to fight the next Desert Storm or a full spectrum, high intensity conflict, but what is our most likely threat? We have all been taught since we were junior leaders to build the base plan on the enemy's most likely course of action and build contingencies, branches, or sequels to counter the enemy's most dangerous threat. In the context of the Global War on Terrorism, my belief is that the battlefield of the next five to 15 years will be very similar to the Afghanistan environment. Terrain and weather aside, our most probable future threat will occur where there is a weak or unstable government, weak or nonexistent military, geographically isolated or little western influence, strong clan and tribal influence, a haven for terrorist cells or drug traffickers, sympathetic yet generally poor populace, and a strong recruiting base for potential counterinsurgents.

Militarily, this could translate into a contiguous or noncontiguous, nonlinear battlefield with lots of white space. It means joint, conventional,

other government agencies (OGA) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) all working side by side in a confusing environment. Similar to Afghanistan or Iraq, our greatest challenge will still be *finding* the enemy as he moves, morphs, blends, and attacks. His goal will be to further his agenda at all costs while avoiding direct conflict and inflicting as many casualties against soft targets as possible. His timeline is infinite; ours will be finite. His patience will last a lifetime; ours will last for a tour. He will always win the strategic information operations (IO) war; we will always be countering. He will kill civilians and will attempt to blame us.

How do you defeat this enemy, the current and future threat? We have to be better, stronger, and most importantly, FASTER. We are already immeasurably better and stronger. As General John Abizaid has said, "We have not lost a tactical fight since 9/11." We have superior equipment, superior technology and — most importantly — the greatest weapon in the world — the American Soldier. The key to taking our art to the next level, the graduate level, is to operate, morph, blend, make decisions, and kill the enemy FASTER than he can either regenerate or react. This means we have to *find* him FASTER than we currently are. We are still challenged to get inside the enemy's decision or operational cycle.

Organizationally, we are headed in exactly the right direction. The Chief of Staff of the Army's vision to take us from an efficient peacetime organization to an effective wartime Army, with its modular design built around the brigade combat team (BCT), is exactly where we need to go. Through organic or indirect support, this predominant maneuver element will have all the tools necessary to "find, fix and finish" the enemy. However, we have not yet institutionally made the mental shift in the *find* category.

Finding the enemy is bigger than reconnaissance; it's bigger than good intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). It's bigger than designing a formation tasked to accomplish this mission. It's a cultural change our Army has to realize in order to fully capitalize on

BfSB

(Battlefield Surveillance Brigade)

X

Surveillance & Reconnaissance Bn

HHC   BSTB   MI

1 - LRSC   2 - CAV Troops

HHC   LRS

(15 Teams)   (2 Plts Per)

our organizational change and what is needed to defeat our current and most likely future threat. As combat arms leaders, when we can discuss in professional circles the aspects of nodal/link analysis or the art of static surveillance as comfortably as we can how to enter and clear a room, we will have achieved the vision.

I offer some potential thoughts on how to close the gap in this critical area for practical application. They are not designed to be all encompassing or doctrinal in nature but rather considerations for our future and current *find* organizations. By the end of Fiscal Year 2007, organizationally, the Army will be structured to perform this important mission. At the strategic level, joint and Special Operations Forces are continuing to grow and refine; at the operational level, three active component and two Reserve Component battlefield surveillance brigades (BfSBs) will be coming on line. At the tactical level, 44 of 138 maneuver battalions, or roughly one-third of our formations, will have *find* as their primary mission. Eighteen will reside in our Infantry brigade combat teams (IBCTs), six in the Stryker BCTs, and 20 in the Heavy BCTs. That equates to adequacy at all levels; however, the process therein of finding the enemy is incumbent on all.

Intelligence or IPB:

This is obviously one of the first and most critical steps during traditional mission analysis, and a process that never ends. It is also the first step in finding an elusive enemy. Doctrinally and very simplistically, we were all taught that this step entails taking a doctrinal or known template and applying the terrain, weather, current conditions, enemy strength, and past activities or

patterns. The end result is a situation template or SITEMP. From the SITEMP, a tentative plan is developed. However, this SITEMP generally has holes or gaps. If these missing pieces of information need to be resolved before the plan is finalized, they are analyzed and turned into information requirements (IRs). If they are essential for the commander to make a single or critical decision, they are named as priority information requirements (PIRs). In either case, through the process, if the IR or PIR is too complex or big to answer from a single source, instance or location, indicators are developed that when brought together answer that IR. A collection plan can then be developed to collect on the indicators and IR so that when answered, the tentative plan can be refined. This collection plan should entail utilizing all the necessary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets available to the commander. This continues until either the plan has to be executed due to time or the commander feels comfortable enough that he has enough information to proceed. During

execution, the IRs or PIRs that remain unanswered, if filled while prosecuting, allow the commander to either make decisions, implement his planned contingencies, or branches to the base plan. Although this process works for linear, traditional, uniformed formations, it is horizontal in nature, neither dynamic enough nor conducive to either our current or future threat. Because of our superior finishing capability, dynamic leadership and quality Soldiers, it also allows for great differences in our SITEMP and reality. In other words, in most cases we can get away with leading with our face if our intelligence is lacking or wrong.

IPB in the COE:

As discussed earlier, our future fight will most likely be in support of policies and objectives relating to GWOT. Given that assumption, how do we adjust our current intel process to be FASTER than the enemy? First, the adage that IPB is generally an Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) function is no

High-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles with mounted weapons such as the Mk19 grenade machine gun are ideally suited to the ground interdiction missions of special reconnaissance forces.

Courtesy photo

longer valid. At all levels, the synergy gained by integrating the intel function into operational planning as much as course of action development is a must. By doing this, we speed up the intel cycle. In the past, the IBOS worked a piece of intel until it was felt that it contained enough information to develop a tentative plan. In the future, IPB and operational planning must be integrated. Also in the past, there has almost always been a starting point, or in other words, the doctrinal template. In the GWOT or COE, we will not have this luxury. The information exists, but it will have to be researched and studied to build that baseline. Because our future threat will most likely be organized into groups, cells and networks, nodal analysis will be that starting point formally known as the doctrinal template. The primary difference is that a nodal analysis is dynamic, and doctrinal templates are lasting and more rigid.

Nodal analysis in the future will be an art with a little bit of science thrown in for good measure. Police organizations have been doing a similar type of analysis for decades. Because they are constantly fighting a new enemy, their process is in constant change. It will require the art of research; research in areas that are unknown. It will require understanding different cultures and seeing them through other than U.S. eyes or the western mind-set. We have yet to truly come to grips with the Pashtu or Waziri culture, and we have been in contact with them now for more than four years. In some cases, it will require making tough assumptions where facts or data are nonexistent.

For illustrative purposes, let's examine the "next" Osama bin Laden or next Al Qaeda organization in a nodal analysis process. It will have a vision or agenda. It will have associates and brothers in cause that have relationships forged in blood. They will be deeply committed to the cause to the point of death. They will have family, friends, associates, religious or higher calling convictions, places of refuge, operational locations, finances and financiers, weapons, lines and means of communication, ideological followers and supporters, and a military arm. Within the military arm, there will most likely be planners, executors, logistical planners and providers, communicators and couriers, series of safe house/refuge providers, information planners and executors and so on. Each of these could be categorized as a "node." And, each of these nodes would then be further analyzed in a similar fashion to break down the individual parts that make up the nodes. The end result would be an organizational hierarchy or nodal diagram. The relationship, importance of each node and how it interacts would be developed into a link hierarchical diagram. This endstate analysis would be a starting point for tentative planning and would replace the doctrinal template. The other result of this process would be the development of a high value target (HVT) list. The HVT list would include persons, places, or things. HVTs would fall out in order of precedence based on the link hierarchical diagram and would be stacked in order of precedence and importance.

The link analysis or final link diagram would replace the SITEMP. As most know, the SITEMP is the doctrine applied to current terrain, weather, time, and situation. The link diagram would essentially do the same thing. The cells, groups, and other nodes would be further analyzed beyond previous known facts and applied to the current situation and current intelligence known

on each. This process will most likely alter your HVT priority list. A very important distinction between the old and new process would occur here. In the COE, portions or a majority of your nodes or HVTs may be inaccessible, outside your area of operation (AO), or in politically denied areas. Although those that fall into this category would be monitored, any active collection or targeting may not be feasible. The result of this step would be to determine those nodes or HVTs that you can affect or influence. To distinguish the difference, these nodes and HVTs would be renamed as high payoff targets (HPTs).

To this point you have analyzed a group or individual, his makeup and all the things that allow him to operate and live, determined how those things are linked together in order of importance, and then finally determined what you can realistically affect or influence.

Over the past several years, there has been much discussion over the use of the term "centers of gravity." I suggest that there is another important prior step in this analysis called determining critical vulnerabilities. The analogy would be similar to key and decisive terrain, critical events or key tasks and the decisive point in an operation. You must understand the key terrain before you can determine the decisive terrain, and you must analyze the key tasks or events before you can decide on your decisive point. Using the HPT described above, after determining the who, the precedence and what you can affect, a next possible step is to analyze where the enemy is truly vulnerable. Is it how he communicates, how he moves, his associates, money, or his family? From here, we can now begin to formulate a strategy, a collection and targeting plan and ultimately determine the enemy's center of gravity.

This discussion could continue for an entire manual worth of information, but the above is to illustrate how complicated finding the enemy can be in the COE. This is compounded by the Army's transformation plan and the changing of nearly one-third of our forces' primary roles and missions on the battlefield. It is more complicated than inserting an LRS team across the forward line of own troops (FLOT) on a deep reconnaissance mission to answer PIR. It is more comprehensive than sending a Cavalry troop out front to make and maintain contact with the enemy. And, it is bigger than a counter recon plan.

Unfortunately, I don't think there is a doctrinal field manual solution to this. Because the future fight is so ambiguous, the cookie cutter, Cold War-era solution is challenged. However, there are some baseline fundamentals we should be consider. First is the cultural change that needs to occur across our formations. Finding the enemy will be incumbent on all, but in particular, those that are charged with this role must be trained, resourced, and supported to do the mission. The fact that most reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and recon battalions in OIF are being used as another maneuver battalion, and testament from the TF3 observer/controllers at JRTC on the improper use of these units, underline the point that we need to reexamine this.

Next is the integration and fusion of all the assets required to find the enemy and then a designated force ready to fix and finish when ready. These assets would ideally be colocated, in the same time zone, even in the same tent/TOC (tactical operations center), have the right connectivity, working for the same person and all

working toward a common purpose. The desired outcome of this concept would be the ability to place what some call an "unblinking eye" on the enemy. When a unit or organization is reliant on others for intelligence or information, every time that information passes hands there is a "blink" or a pause allowing the enemy time to react. Recent success from TF Phantom in OIF (See page 13) proves that this is a viable concept for the current and future fight. Other BCTs are experimenting with similar designs by designating their recon battalions as the chief of reconnaissance. Taking it one step further, I would offer that every BCT should designate or have a chief of IPRS (intelligence, plans, reconnaissance and surveillance). A single place is needed where intelligence and plans are integrated, collection and targeting are nested, and reconnaissance and surveillance are centralized to refine and confirm the picture. It would also have the right analysts and exploiters, side by side with the planners to wargame and search out the right answers to an unclear picture. Those analysts would also have the right connectivity and pipes to support reaching back to the various databases to further exploit the unknowns.

Another fundamental worth considering is maturity in our recon formations. This topic is one of the greatest concerns to commanders in the field. Due to the "newness" of the modular concept, the depth in recon experience is currently very shallow and in most cases nonexistent. This will change over the next several years but is still of great concern at present. Every unit that has ever been special or unique is that way for two reasons, its people and its resources. If we are to truly develop capable *find* organizations throughout the Army, picking the right people to serve and lead is going to be critical.

Finally, the fundamental way in which we train needs to change. From the school house and introductory training to the combat training centers and even home station training, we must evolve to equally integrate all the aspects of finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy. Traditionally, we will expend 75 percent of our time, energy, and resources on movement, maneuver, and actions on the objective. OIF and OEF have shown us that we need to spend more time on getting to the line of departure. We can never lose our edge or incredible lethality as that has been our hallmark for 230-plus years, but in order to keep pace with our ever changing, ever elusive enemy we must be FASTER than he is. If we could find the men who are making the IEDs that are killing our Soldiers, we could kill them and their accomplices, too.

Lieutenant Colonel James J. Mingus currently commands the 4th Ranger Training Battalion, which is responsible for the first phase of Ranger School and the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course. He previously commanded two Long Range Surveillance Units, and served as the operations officer for the 1st Ranger Battalion and as a lead planner for the Joint Special Operations Command. He has had numerous tours in support of both Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom.

RECONNAISSANCE & SURVEILLANCE LEADERS COURSE

PAST AND PRESENT

In 1986, the Long Range Surveillance Leaders Course (LRSLC) was formed to fill the void in infantry and ranger training for deep reconnaissance and long range surveillance (LRS). In 2002, the Infantry Center gained proponency for long range surveillance from the Military Intelligence branch. In the same year infantry leadership adjusted the program of instruction (POI) and changed the name of the course to "Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course" (RSLC) to encompass all infantry reconnaissance elements including scout platoons and LRS.

In 2003, RSLC began implementing post 9/11 changes. Changes to the threat template, technological advancements, and emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) learned and employed in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) became the primary focus of the revamped POI. Implementation of the additional skill identifier "6B" (Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader) in October 2004 increased the Army's ability to track trained reconnaissance and surveillance leaders. This is the only course that qualifies those in the "find" role for an ASI to track this essential skill set. The mission of RSLC is to further develop the combat arms-related functional skills of officer and NCO volunteers eligible for assignment to units whose primary mission is to conduct surveillance, reconnaissance operations, target acquisition, combat assessment, sensor emplacement/recovery, and target interdiction. RSLC conducts mobile training teams (MTTs) "globally" and provides instructor support for observer/controller (OC) missions as well.

In 2005, the RSLC POI was updated with focus on the "find" mission and to stay relevant to the current and future fight. Leaders with this mission must have training that goes beyond basic route or area recon. Persistent surveillance along with targeting and the ability to complement and work in conjunction with all of the other "INTs" must be part of today's reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)/LRS/Recce leader's kit bag. This is the place (RSLC) to become an expert and hone your skills as a "Soldier Sensor." Today, all Soldiers operate in a mounted and dismounted role. We focus on the "Soldier Sensor" based skills, recognizing they may use these skills from a wide array of platforms (from their own boots to a Stryker).

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RSLC Expansion
In 2006, RSLC carried over an expanding student load to meet increased training requirements from the force. As modularity continues to progress, the demand for reconnaissance and surveillance leaders has

increased significantly. In FY07, RSLC will increase the annual student load to 612, with an optimal class size of 48 students per class. Through a recent Department of the Army decision, two simultaneous courses will be conducted in order to meet this training requirement. Expanding will allow the United States Army Infantry School and future Maneuver Center of Excellence to accommodate the force in training and producing reconnaissance and surveillance professionals. RSLC graduates are experts in urban and restrictive terrain, maneuvering in thick vegetation, in support of newly developed heavy, Stryker, and infantry formations.

In past LRSLC/RSLC classes, course attendants were primarily comprised of LRS, Special Forces, and Ranger personnel. That paradigm, however, has shifted significantly as the force continues to evolve. The RSLC now trains Soldiers who specialize in reconnaissance, surveillance, and deep targeting from across the light, airborne, and air assault forces.

In the last three classes, close to half of enrolled students were 19D cavalry scouts. The most recent class this year included comments from a 19D3VF7 student who quipped "this is the best training I've had compared to other recon courses I have attended in the past." He summarized his comments by recommending that all reconnaissance leaders attend RSLC. Another student (a commander from an IBCT reconnaissance troop) commented that "all leaders in this type unit should attend RSLC." The course is experiencing a new student base that includes personnel from the entire combined arms team: engineers/ "Sappers" (21A/B); forward observers (13F) from new BCTs; communicators (25U/C) from ranger recce platoons and LRS; cryptologic linguists (98G) from Special Forces SOD-As; U.S. Marine Corps reconnaissance; as well as traditional CMF 11 officers and NCOs from across the infantry force.

RSLC POI Changes/ Enhancements

In the summer of 2004, many Soldiers and leaders — fresh from the fight abroad — began to press the imperative of training Soldiers on the systems that they will employ and rely upon in combat. Their initiative sparked a series of events that has generated professional input, insight, and attention from reconnaissance leaders throughout the world. After many revisions, and continued input from concerned leaders, a new and improved RSLC POI has emerged as the most comprehensive overhaul of course material and training in RSLC history. The new and improved POI possesses effectiveness and relevancy that corresponds directly with evolving TTPs and equipment used in the current fight. The course is committed to providing the Army with the finest and most highly trained light, airborne, air assault, and special operations reconnaissance leaders as necessary in order to meet Army initiatives and global requirements.

The RSLC maintains a mind-set of change and improvement today. Worldwide experiences relayed from incoming cadre,

An RSLC student conducts surveillance using a TSE digital camera.

comments recorded from course critiques and experienced students, and AARs/lessons learned from the field keep the POI — and equipment and emerging technology — relevant and current to warfare. Using this kind of feedback in 2005, RSLC instructors developed new lesson plans and outlines for vehicle mobility training and training on current technology being employed with new multiband radios. RSLC instructors have also incorporated classes for the Vector XXI targeting system and tactical surveillance equipment in effort to give commander's the ability to "see" what their teams are seeing in near real time. The need to provide tactical commanders with digital photographs and even digital video of known or suspected enemy locations has resulted in classes in imagery collection and transmission in the RSLC. POI changes and equipment enhancements include:

● Multiband and joint communications training on systems including: AN/PRC-117F (SATCOM), AN/PRC-150 (HF), AN/PRC-148 (MBITR), CFM34/CF18 (Toughbook/TACCHAT).

● Imagery collection and data transmission including use of the "TSE" camera surveillance kit and compression software, small unmanned aerial vehicles (SUAVs) and planning considerations for their employment.

● Vehicle navigation in an urban environment; map reading test has been revised and shortened to a 25-question, one-hour exam.

● "Vehicle identification" classes now include vehicles, weapons, and equipment; students are also given a handbook for use in identifying ammunition, uniforms, and language.

● The "G2 Organization" class has been replaced with a class on "Military Intelligence Support;" two-way ISR and link analysis are also taught during RSLC intelligence training.

● Target acquisition, combat assessment, and call-for-fire training has been significantly enhanced to include training in joint fires employment through the use of the IFT Multipurpose Joint Close Air Support Trainer (originally used by U.S. Air Force

RSLC photos

An RSLC student communicates with an AN/PRC-117F (SATCOM), Toughbook, using Zinc-Air extended life, non-rechargeable batteries.

controllers). Similar to the old "Guard Fist," this computer-based program provides video-game quality training on close air support (CAS), close combat attack (CCA), naval gun fire, as well as all conventional fire support assets. Future training evolutions will include exposure to and training on the Vector XXI targeting system.

● Target interdiction and sniper employment.

● Tracking and counter-tracking instruction now incorporates the use of police tracking dogs.

● Mobile reconnaissance and vehicle-borne surveillance:
   ○ Small unit vehicle battle drills;
   ○ Load planning;
   ○ Vehicle-borne reconnaissance & surveillance (surveillance communications equipment employment, urban recon);
   ○ Vehicle techniques (security-corners, underpass, echeloning);
   ○ Vehicle types (ATVs, NSTVs, HMMWVs, Stryker, BFV); and
   ○ Art of Camouflage – Use of like vehicles, blending in with those units/formation that already have a presence established, with the use of covert cameras and sensors; shadow blinds/false walls and urban concealment.

RSLC's Emerging Future

RSLC continues to enhance the capabilities in support of the course POI by testing emerging equipment relevant to the force and future combat systems. RSLC has initiated the interest of a hand-held thermal imaging device that possesses targeting capabilities with the use of coded lasers. RSLC is assisting the Soldier Battle Lab at Fort Benning in the development of a new vehicular reconnaissance platform for the force (air transportable, maneuverable in rough terrain, removable armor and armament).

An RSLC student employs communication equipment with new "solar" power technology that the course is testing.

RSLC will continue to conduct the 33-day, ASI-producing course graduating trained leaders for the *find* mission. Ongoing course modifications will continue to remain relevant to match technological advancements and emerging doctrine. RSLC will retain the flexibility to conduct MTTs, O/C missions, and external unit support as it pertains to modularity, transformation, and predeployment activities. The course expansion will continue to meet the needs of the new modular force while combining efforts with the U.S. Army Armor School. In keeping with the forthcoming "Maneuver Center of Excellence" goal of unity of command and gaining combat synergy with common doctrine and principles using distinct mounted and dismounted elements, continued RSLC growth is imminent. The merger will not be to the degradation of the current, over-the-horizon communications, joint fires, evasion planning and insertion techniques expertise. RSLC will continue to be the SME (subject matter expert) on airborne, air assault, light, and special reconnaissance. The course will continue to provide assistance with the development of units, doctrine, and equipment fielding.

The course is committed to remain relevant to the force and the future fight. Please continue to forward any emerging ISR tactics, techniques, and procedures/ lessons learned to the course cadre. RSLC contact info: Commander/1SG - (706) 544-6216/6831; Operations - (706) 544-6047, DSN: 784-6047; RSLC Web site - www.benning.mil/rtb/new_lrsc/ default.htm; SIPERNET - RSLC@ Benningdms.army.smil.mil.

The following RSLC cadre contributed to this article:

Major Eric C. Flesch, course commander, has served in two different Joint Special Operations task forces during OEF and OIF. He also previously commanded an LRSD and an air assault rifle company.

Ritchie "Huff" Huffaker, course technician, is a retired NCO with assignments with the Ranger Regiment and multiple LRS units.

Antonio Burgess, intelligence technician, is a retired NCO with assignments with both the Ranger Regiment and Special Forces.

Jeff Sawhill, reconnaissance and surveillance technician, is a retired NCO whose service included multiple LRS assignments.

TASK FORCE PHANTOM

MAJOR ANTONIO L. THOMPSON

Task Force Phantom is the infantry and intelligence task force chartered by Multi-National Corps-Iraq in 2005 to detect and interdict insurgents along Iraq's frontiers. The task force is anchored by the corps long range surveillance company (LRSC), whose 15 teams provide eyewitness reporting of targets named by MNC-I.

Task Force Phantom's intelligence assets include the LRSC's organic All Source Intelligence Technician and Intelligence Sergeant. These have been extensively augmented by assets drawn from corps-level IMINT, HUMINT, SIGINT and MASINT systems. They include:

❑ **IMINT** — AIRSCAN, a small aircraft carrying powerful sensors, provides both stock and near real-time imagery of an area of operations. It helps to confirm or deny enemy activity around surveillance targets. Task Force Phantom also draws on theater-level systems, such as the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), for aerial surveillance.

❑ **HUMINT** — Tactical human intelligence teams (THTs) composed of counterintelligence agents and interrogators accompany LRS teams on their missions along Iraq's frontiers.

❑ **SIGINT** — Electronic surveillance systems operated by Arabic-speaking linguists gather near-real-time information from a target area.

❑ **MASINT** — Remotely attended OMNISENSE sensors report vehicle and foot movements in terrain otherwise inaccessible to U.S. surveillance.

Task Force Phantom also employs SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT analysts to conduct targeting, receive combat information, report finished intelligence, and renew the cycle, all the while focusing specifically on Task Force Phantom's specific mission and area of operations.

Major Antonio L. Thompson is currently serving as the battalion executive officer for the 519th Military Intelligency Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) (Airborne). He commanded Task Force Phantom, the first ISR task force in Iraq.

ORIGIN AND INTENT OF TF PHANTOM

An ISR task force, (TF Phantom) was formed by the Multi-National Corps-Iraq commander as an economy of force, to minimize the use of brigade and battalion-size conventional forces necessary to interdict illegal activity and insurgency operations within a large area of operations. The ISR task force utilized Long Range Surveillance units (LRSU) and intelligence assets available at the corps level to monitor, control, and influence insurgent activities along Iraq's numerous unsecured border areas. The ISR task force combines the following intelligence systems: imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).

This ISR task force gives us a glimpse of what is ahead with the proposed battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB). Its many successes relied on the fusion of the LRS capabilities on the ground, with the other "INTs" and analysis systems employed under the same command. Task Force Phantom was such a success that the subsequent MNC-I HQs are continuing with the "concept unit." The BfSB design with a LRS company, builds on this with a more robust "I" in the ISR capability, and a staff organized for the employment of other joint, Special Operations, aviation, and fires assets. *(Prepared by the RSLC cadre working group.)*

Know Your Beat:

National Guard Unit Conducts Long Range Surveillance in Iraq

CAPTAIN MIKE MANNING

Soldiers from the 173rd Infantry Detachment (LRS) perform a terrain denial mission near Bayji, Iraq.
Photos courtesy of the 173rd Infantry Detachment (LRS)

The 173rd Infantry Detachment (Long Range Surveillance [LRS]), a unit organic to the Rhode Island National Guard, deployed to Iraq in January 2005 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) III. The unit was assigned to the 42nd Infantry Division, Task Force Liberty, where it served as the division Long Range Surveillance Detachment (LRSD). In the months prior to deployment, the unit trained at home station in East Greenwich, Rhode Island, and at Fort Drum, New York.

I had the honor of commanding this unit throughout its entire cycle, from home station training until our return to the United States in November 2005. My intent with this article is to give readers a true sense of how the 173rd was task organized and employed during OIF III. My desire is to delineate what we did, in the hope that our experience may prove valuable to other units and Soldiers preparing to deploy overseas. This article will focus on the actions and experiences of the unit while deployed to Iraq and will describe how we fought is well within the capabilities of any reconnaissance unit at any level from battalion through corps.

Mobilization

Prior to mobilization, the 173rd was organized under a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and a property book that was dissimilar in many ways to that of other long range surveillance detachments. There were in fact some glaring differences. Our communication equipment was one example. The 173rd carried PRC-77s on its books as the primary means of Very High Frequency (VHF) communication. Additionally, LRS teams operating outside of VHF range found themselves communicating with the PRC-104. LRS units in the active component had used the PRC-138 or 150 for years. Thankfully, one of my team leaders had been employed by Harris Industries,

the company that produces the PRC-150. Due to this relationship, my Soldiers had been able to become familiar with the PRC-150 in the two to three years leading up to mobilization. This would pay dividends for us during the deployment. The 173rd also did not have any satellite communication (SATCOM) capabilities, nor did we have any PEQ-2As and/or PAQ-4s nighttime laser aiming devices or any range-finding devices on my books.

These deficiencies in both the communication and laser arenas were corrected in the long run at varying times throughout the deployment through the use of an operational needs statement (ONS) and an outstanding detachment executive officer who always found a way to get the Soldiers what they needed. Subsequently, when deployed my teams could communicate with multiple means of communication, and through the use of night vision devices — including PEQ-2As and the Ground Commander's Pointer (GCP) — we owned the night.

Weapons, Training, and Ranger Cadre Support

One area where my organization had a distinct advantage was in the number of crew-served weapon systems we brought to the fight. Prior to our federal mobilization, 1 was able to laterally transfer five Mk19 grenade machine guns from a Military Police unit in the state. Additionally, when we arrived at Fort Drum, the 173rd acquired five M240B machine guns, five M2 .50 caliber machine guns, and nine M249 squad automatic weapons. Previous to this, the most effective casualty producing weapons in my arms room were our five M60 machine guns. With the acquisition of the Mk19s, M2s and M240Bs, we had the ability to get into a fight and win. Coupled with the multiple M1114 high mobility

multipurpose wheeled vehicles we received in country, this was a formidable combination. Dialogue with reconnaissance experts who had recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan told us that we would need the ability to reach out and destroy targets. This was reinforced by the cadre of D Company, Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leaders Course (RSLC), 4th Ranger Training Battalion, who were able to provide updates from those reconnaissance and surveillance units that had already been deployed. We also received instruction on urban reconnaissance and a planning exercise prior to deploying.

Once we had received our mobilization order, the 42nd Infantry Division G-3 made it clear that the 42nd ID did not intend to employ my detachment solely in a passive reconnaissance capacity. At the G-3's urging, in April 2004 I sent 15 Soldiers from the detachment to Camp Robertson, Arkansas, to attend the National Guard Marksmanship Training Center's Sniper School. With the addition of these 15 school-trained snipers, I had a total of 20 school-trained snipers in the detachment. Each of my six LRS teams now had its own sniping capability. Additionally, in May I took my HQs element and team leaders to Fort Benning to attend the Sniper

Employment Course (SEO) at the U.S. Army Sniper School. It was during that stay at Fort Benning that we had the opportunity to participate in a mobile training team (MTT) event facilitated by cadre from D Company, 4th Ranger Training Battalion, in which subject matter experts from D Company instructed my unit in urban reconnaissance. All of these training opportunities were invaluable. We recognized early on that as LRS personnel we were first and foremost human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors; the commander was counting on us to provide near real time intelligence. However, through discussions with LRS personnel who had just returned from OIF, it was evident that to maximize our effectiveness in the contemporary operating environment (COE) we had to be prepared to assume the roles of full-time collector and sometimes civil affairs, psychological operations, hunter killer, and other missions as needed.

As part of our predeployment training, the detachment executed two Combat Training Center rotations. One rotation was through the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisianna, and the other was through the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. We also completed a mission readiness exercise at

Fort Drum. Every member of the 173rd also went through the First U.S. Army's Designated Marksman (DM) program of instruction. Over a two week period of time in September 2004, my unit expended 20,000 rounds of 5.56 ball ammunition. During this time, the unit received 20 M14 rifles and six M24 sniper systems. My sniper-trained Soldiers spent hours on the range in order to master the use of these systems. We worked extensively with vehicles, conducting mounted battle drills. In a unit of light fighters by design, most of my Soldiers and NCOs had to familiarize themselves with operating with vehicles. We rehearsed and drilled repetitiously, and soon my teams were comfortable operating in a mounted mode.

During these months of training, we never strayed far from our bread and butter skills as an LRSD; the NCOs made sure of this. My teams worked on such field crafts as hide/surveillance site construction, break out drills, land navigation, battle drills, and communications on a regular basis. Eight months is a long time to prepare a unit to deploy overseas, and we made full use of the time available to us. It was good that we had ample time to accomplish unit-specific training as well as generic mobilization tasks as specified by the mobilization site at Fort Drum. We knocked out the generic training up front in the early months, and then as a unit we focused on LRS-specific tasks. As commander, I had a lot of flexibility in how and what we trained; thankfully I had a supportive chain of command who saw fit to give me a lot of autonomy regarding the training calendar. You can never train enough, but I speak for my NCOs when I tell you that by December, we felt as a unit that we were ready for the "championship game."

Arrival in Iraq

Prior to deployment, in October 2004 the 173rd had been attached to the 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 82nd Airborne Division (Task Force Palehorse), which was assigned to the 42nd ID for OIF III. However, shortly after our arrival in country operational control of my unit was given to the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 3rd Infantry Division (TF Raider). The 1st BCT commander dispatched us to Samarra,

A 173rd Infantry Detachment Soldier zeroes an M-14 at a range outside Samarra, Iraq.

Iraq, in support of the 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor (TF Power). TF Power was responsible for Samarra, its surrounding environs, and the western desert out to the division boundary with the II Marine Expeditionary Force. My unit was employed in an economy of force role in support of TF Power. The preponderance of forces assigned to TF Power was located in Samarra, but we operated throughout the task force's area of operations.

Operations in Samarra

During the 90 days that the 173rd supported TF Power, we executed a wide variety of missions that included reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. Most reconnaissance-oriented organizations will include these tasks on their mission essential task list (METL); we certainly did. What changed for my unit beginning in Samarra was the way that we understood and executed these tasks. The TF commander wanted to employ my LRS teams in the capacity where we had the ability to observe, report, and if the conditions were set, kill the bad guys. The interdiction piece was new for my unit. For years, LRS units had conducted passive reconnaissance — the only time a LRS unit pulled the trigger was when they were breaking contact. We were no different. However, in our experience, this was not a huge paradigm shift; frankly, we saw this as a natural progression to an LRS operation. Thankfully, during the predeployment phase of the operation, we had trained extensively for the inevitability of being tasked with offensive-oriented mission sets. The mechanics of the LRS operation were still the same. The interdiction piece did not change the way we approached the LRS operation; we simply added another step into our planning and mission execution.

The 173rd developed a battle rhythm based on the green, amber, and red model. At any given time, I had 33 percent or two six-man LRSUs employed in sector. These teams were employed as autonomous entities but also in a heavy team configuration with two LRS teams working in tandem. We had used some foresight during the predeployment phase and developed habitual working relationships between different teams within the detachment. These relationships proved to be lifesavers for us. In my experience, a six-man element cannot operate effectively in most circumstances in a mounted posture. Now, if I combine two six-man elements, I bring a lot more to the table by way of effectiveness: 12 men, four trucks, and firepower. To ensure the teams are at 100-percent fill, you can handpick Soldiers from teams that are off cycle. Another great tool the reconnaissance leader can place in his kit bag is to have a headquarters section and/or communications section comprised of personnel who have the ability to integrate into a team. LRSDs by definition have a very robust communications section; most of the men assigned to commo within my unit

had secondary military occupational specialties (MOS) of 11B. During the predeployment phase, these men had participated in most of the training that my teams conducted. We embraced a concept of the "total athlete" in the unit and it paid off for us. Men assigned to my base radio teams often filled the ranks in my LRS teams. While two LRS teams were employed, two teams were in isolation preparing for the next set, and the remaining two teams (33 percent of my combat power) were recovering. The team in the amber cycle, augmented by personnel from my communications section or headquarters, was responsible for insertion, extractions, and assuming quick reaction force (QRF) responsibilities. We implemented this battle rhythm right at the beginning of the deployment and it worked.

Throughout the deployment, my teams had typically anywhere from 24 to 48 hours to plan. However, there were cases when my Soldiers were given 12-24 hours to plan and at other times less than that. The first sergeant was the keeper of the time line; he was the task master. One of the factors that truly contributed to our success in Iraq was that we never rushed to failure in any operation that we undertook. Deliberation had priority over haste. My NCOs were always afforded the opportunity to execute good troop leading procedures to standard. My team leaders had a good understanding of the military decision-making process (MDMP) and were held to task during their course of action (COA) decision brief regardless of the mission. In the LRS community, we celebrate our collective ability to plan — the ability to formulate a concise, coherent plan is one of the staples of a good unit. I am not going to suggest to you that my unit executed a doctrinal, by-the-numbers, planning sequence every time a team went through the wire because we didn't. Not once during my 11 months overseas did we receive a mission planning folder (MPF). Typically, I received a task and purpose from the S3 and a supporting named area of interest (NAI) or target area of interest (TAI) data from the S2; that was enough. What we developed internally as it pertained to planning was not rocket science, but it worked well. We developed internal controls within the detachment so that every time my Soldiers left the wire they had been given every possible tool to succeed during the operation. My 1SG and team leaders did a remarkable job of incorporating rehearsals, pre-combat inspections, and pre-combat checks. Given frequent time and mission constraints, time management was critical. Regardless of time constraints, there are certain gates a unit must hit prior to employing one of its elements. I have seen some units disregard this fact, and their Soldiers suffered because of it.

One additional note of importance pertains to the planning phase or amber cycle. Given that we were operating in close proximity to the forward operating base (FOB) and that we were working the same battle space over and over again, it was feasible for me and my leaders to actually recon a particular NAI prior to mission execution. Understanding that there were coalition forces (CF) all over the area, it was very easy for us in most cases to give the team an opportunity to look at the terrain and identify a possible hide or surveillance site location prior to mission execution. Again, this was dependent on METT-TC (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time, civilians), so it was not always possible. Many times, the 173rd was the only show in town, so it was not prudent for us to show our hand or close on a particular area lest we compromise the mission. This was a big change to the way an LRSD historically conducted business. In the past, teams would be inserted well behind enemy lines, something that made it difficult to get a look at the ground. In the COE, the fight affords the recon Soldier an opportunity to do some things a little differently than he is accustomed to.

Passive Reconnaissance and the Short Range Patrol

The two most frequent tasks that we accomplished while in Samarra were reconnaissance and target acquisition or terrain denial. I will address the former task first. The preponderance of forces within the TF was centered around Samarra proper so we were tasked to execute a huge reconnaissance effort to the west. The purpose of this operation was to confirm or deny the presence of anti-Iraqi forces (AIF). There exists a north-south running road from Fallujah to Samarra. It was believed that this road and the series of trail networks to the west were heavily trafficked by AIF. Our job was to essentially go find the bad guys, and we did. This operation lasted approximately 30 days from start to finish. It incorporated both mounted and dismounted operations. This, by definition, was a hybrid mission for an LRSD. We relied heavily on the use of vehicles. Earlier in my career, I had spent some time as a platoon leader in a brigade reconnaissance troop. In this situation my team leaders

applied many of the same Cavalry tactics, techniques, and procedures that I had learned as a young lieutenant. The beauty, however, of an LRSD or an infantry unit specializing in reconnaissance is that you have so many options when it comes to employment in the COE. I have always maintained that if a team can display proficiency in LRS operations from receipt of the warning order through the debrief, this same team will be capable of mastering other associated or disassociated tasks. This applies to mounted operations as well. The 173rd demonstrated the ability to sustain for 72 hours in a dismounted or mounted posture. During the execution of these sets, my teams relied heavily on high frequency and SATCOM in order to communicate with the detachment operations base. In my experience, I came in contact with very few units in Iraq that were capable of accomplishing the same feat due to differences in training and equipment. The HUMINT that my unit collected during this reconnaissance effort was utilized in a joint operation by the 1st BCT, 3rd ID and the 8th Regimental Combat Team, 2nd Marine Division. This was a very rewarding endeavor for us. Additionally, during this time, intelligence

that my teams collected subsequently produced viable targets. We were then utilized to conduct surveillance on these targets, one of which was a suspected terrorist training camp.

In the previous paragraph, I alluded to the fact that my teams collected accurate HUMINT which subsequently led to follow-on operations by CF. What I did not mention was that the best intelligence was collected by speaking with the locals. If you take away anything from this article, I would ask you to pay special attention to this next topic. There exists a real need in the COE for Soldiers who are trained to execute covert operations in a dismounted or mounted posture. These Soldiers remain unseen, and thereby are afforded the opportunity to kill the bad guys at a specific place and time. This same Soldier, however, can often achieve the same effect by investing time and resources in the local population in order to develop community contacts. I was blessed in many ways with the Soldiers in my unit, but specifically I had a number of Soldiers who had been police officers in their civilian jobs. They understood the importance of community policing or developing community contacts better than anyone else that I came in

Soldiers with the 173rd Infantry Detachment (LRS) talk with an Iraqi man during a mission. By investing time and resources in the local population, the Soldiers were able to develop community contacts.

contact with over there. During this 30-day reconnaissance effort and throughout the remainder of the deployment, we committed a lot of effort to establishing rapport with the local residents. We identified early on that there are good people everywhere, and that if you can establish mutual trust with them, they will in time be forthcoming with intelligence that will assist you in doing your job.

The term "presence patrol" is thrown around very loosely. Iraq is too dangerous to push Soldiers through the wire just to make a presence in sector. Every time a patrol leaves the wire, it should have a distinct task and purpose. I would argue (as would my NCOs) that a unit executing a presence patrol is in actuality conducting a passive reconnaissance patrol.

We developed a technique while in Samarra which we later applied to Bayji and its surrounding environs. We called it the "Coalition of the Willing;" it was a combined 173rd, Shadow (corps tactical human intelligence teams [THTs]), civil affairs personnel, and PSYOPS effort. Not every element was represented at every turn, but we did work extensively with the corps THTs that were operating in Samarra. We developed a tremendous relationship with these Soldiers, and this effort was mutually beneficial. Many times the intelligence that the THTs collected was then in turn acted upon by my unit, i.e., surveillance, direct action, etc. My teams would roll out into sector and engage the local population in an attempt to collect HUMINT.

In order to be successful, we had to revisit the same sources repeatedly. I have seen the benefits of this method. On several occasions, we were led to multiple caches, and we also received HUMINT on TF high value targets (HVTs). This works. In my opinion, we need to continue to work on establishing relationships with the local population.

Target acquisition or terrain denial was the other type of mission with which we were tasked. My Soldiers were employed with the expressed intent of killing AIF. We executed these sets as part of the TF counter-IED/mortar fight. The TF 3-69 commander and his staff had a good understanding of how to deny AIF the use of terrain, and my unit was subsequently employed in an effective manner. Dan Smith wrote a great article in *Infantry* Magazine's July-August 2005 edition about this subject. Smith talked about the importance of hunting the enemy the way one would hunt a deer. I would like to expound on this concept. In Samarra, the TF had dedicated a tank company to route security/clearance along Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa. This company was out there every hour of every day making contact. This is a very important stipulation in my opinion — they were making contact and maintaining contact. To make contact with the bad guys does not necessarily mean that you are exchanging small arms fire. In most cases, you make contact with the enemy without even knowing it in the COE. Why is this? Well, in Iraq for example, AIF in most cases look like any other Iraqis. A lot of times, you don't realize an individual is AIF until you observe him emplacing an IED, for example. This tank company, by virtue of being out in sector around the clock, was causing the AIF to react to them and not the other way around. The key is to get into their decision-making cycle and force them to react to you. Terrain denial is effectively accomplished by employing both overt and covert

elements. In this case, the tank company was the overt element. With their vehicles, which were visible and seen by the locals, their presence forced the AIF to displace or break contact in order to conduct combat operations. Based on empirical data, the covert element is infused into the operation. In this case, the 173rd was that element. Based on an analysis the S-2 had conducted, my element was tasked with conducting terrain denial at a specific NAI or TAI. Coordination is the key here; the covert element has to be in step with the overt element. Both elements need to be dedicated to this operation for the long haul. It does no good to have a team covertly hidden if the overt element cannot stay in sector for the duration of the operation. Success is defined by killing AIF at a time and place of your choosing. Use the overt element to force the bad guys into a particular "window" and then kill them.

Adjacent unit coordination is imperative, not only for unity of effort but also to avoid fratricide. I cannot stress this last comment enough. My teams used everything from chicken coops, wells, abandoned buildings and elephant grass along the Tigris River for their hides. At other times, depending on the duration of the mission and NAI, they would set up 200-300 meters off the road in the desert, unseen even to a trained eye using night vision devices. In order to avoid the temptation of setting patterns, we used vehicles organic to the detachment, route clearance vehicles, civilian contractor vehicles and on the rare occasion, helicopters for insertion and extraction platforms. To be successful, one has to think outside the box. By making use of these different platforms, we avoided the natural tendency to set patterns.

We need to keep another point in mind: when operating in close proximity to other coalition forces, it is imperative to be cognizant of the battle rhythm and movements of adjacent units. On one occasion, one of my vehicles was destroyed by a mine during a LRS extraction along the Tigris to the east of Bayji. The mine had been emplaced in an area that was unfamiliar to my unit; we had not operated in this particular area before. However, I later came to find out that the infantry company that was responsible for this AO regularly patrolled the area in close proximity to the NAI. In fact, I also found out from the company commander that his tank platoon used to frequent this area almost daily. His platoon would establish overt observation posts intermittently throughout the day. I had done adjacent unit coordination with this commander prior to employing my team, and the S2 had given me historical data for this area. The company commander and task force (TF) staff were aware of our scheme of maneuver; everyone was on board. What I did not have was a clear understanding of the friendly situation in its entirety. My team leader responsible for the mission should have linked up with that tank platoon leader to fully understand the extent of their daily patrols, and I should have facilitated this meeting. When operating in an economy of force role, the TF area of operations is your playground. The implied task, however, is that the reconnaissance unit must be the master of all. You have to know everything concerning both friendly and enemy activity that is occurring in the battle space. In the words of Staff Sergeant Tommy O'Hare, "Know your beat."

These types of patrols are hunter-killer missions. A team is

employed with the expressed intent of destroying a target. The S3 for 1-17 CAV, Major Neil Reilly, referred to these patrols as short range patrols (SRP), phonetically pronounced "sherp." Given the plethora of weapons and weapon systems that we had acquired during predeployment, we had a unique ability to manipulate the composition of the patrol and the different weapon systems utilized by the teams. For example, during dismounted operations, I mandated that at least one belt-fed weapon was integrated into the patrol. And in many circumstances, the team leader would opt to go with a crew-served weapon system and possibly an AT4 depending on METT-TC. These patrols were very effective, but success for these teams operating in a dismounted posture as a hunter is dependent on the overt element doing their job. Again, someone pushes the deer and another kills it. It sounds like a simple concept, but it is difficult to execute; you have to work at it.

The latter half of our tour in Iraq was spent in Bayji supporting an armor task force. Try as we might, it just never came together concerning the terrain denial fight. So consequently, we had to redefine success. My original intent was to kill as many AIF as possible, but at a minimum, my presence denied him the ability to kill or wound coalition forces in the battle space that I owned. The terrain denial fight is everyone's responsibility. The AIF have identified the roads as the line of contact in Iraq. This is where he comes to kill us, and in turn, it is where we will kill him. Ideally, however, we should desire to interdict AIF in this case prior to him attempting to kill CF along the roads. In my opinion, the most effective way we do this is through offensive operations based on solid intelligence designed to kill or capture AIF. To reiterate, when it comes to HUMINT collection, nothing beats the passive reconnaissance patrol.

We were moved to Bayji by the brigade commander because the IED and VBIED threat had become increasingly more prevalent in the TF AO. My unit executed

In support of Operation City Market, Soldiers from the 173rd Infantry Detachment (LRS) set up a sniper overwatch/blocking position along the Tigris River in Samarra.

terrain denial operations almost exclusively. TTPs that we had developed in Samarra were for the most part applicable to this new AO. The caveat is that every AO has its own threat and its own pool of bad guys. However, what one AIF cell does in a particular AO in many cases is similar to what another cell is executing in another. AIF share TTPs and communicate with each other just like we do. This is why we felt compelled as a unit to ensure that our story boards were distributed widely. This is a technique that I would recommend to any unit, and not just those that specialize in recon. Take the time to do a good after action review (AAR) and debrief in order to capture the essence of the patrol. We don't need to reinvent the wheel every time we go through the wire.

Conclusion

In my opinion, the 173rd Infantry Detachment played a critical role in contributing to the overall success of two task forces during its 11-month tour. We capitalized on an opportunity to affect the TF battle space positively by going where other coalition forces could not. Given our ability to communicate at long ranges

outside of VHF range and our ability to execute sets long in duration, we caused AIF to react to us and not the other way around. The Army is constantly changing the way it conducts business; it is evident to this Soldier that reconnaissance units that can collect intelligence in a variety of different ways and destroy targets with long range, direct fire weapons will contribute greatly to the success of our Army. Reconnaissance is a growth industry, and there will always be a need for highly trained, well-disciplined Soldiers in its ranks. I believe that reconnaissance elements found in light, mechanized, airborne, or air assault infantry units can be most effective by cross-training and integrating TTPs that exist in each of these types of units. In the reconnaissance arena, we do more with less, and the proper integration of a dedicated reconnaissance unit into the TF fight at any level will ensure that the commander manipulates the battle space to the best of his ability.

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Armor OES Expands to Include 'Reconnaissance-Centric Training'

MAJOR GENERAL TERRY L. TUCKER

Editor's Note: The following article is reprinted from the July-August 2005 issue of Armor *Magazine. At the time it was written, Major General Terry L. Tucker was serving as the Commanding General of the U.S. Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky.*

I would like to take this opportunity to update the Armor community on some of the exciting changes to the Officer Education System (OES) here at Fort Knox. As the primary unit responsible for officer training, the 16th Cavalry Regiment has been the catalyst for most of these changes.

I'll start with the Armor Officer Basic Course (AOBC), which will retain its primary mission to prepare Army and Marine Corps Armor lieutenants in the basic fundamentals of leading a platoon in the full spectrum of operations. In keeping pace with Army modularity, we have developed a new program of instruction that is current and relevant. We have expanded the curriculum from just "tank centric" training to include more "reconnaissance centric" training to provide the skills necessary for Armor lieutenants to lead a tank and/or a reconnaissance platoon in combat. We have made a number of significant changes to support this shift. For instance, gunnery no longer consists of just firing tanks; lieutenants now fire the MK19 40mm machine gun, the M249 squad automatic weapon , and the .50-caliber machine gun from a high mobility, multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV). We also merged the four-day HMMWV field training exercise with the three-day urban operations field training exercise and created a seven-day stability and support operations field training exercise to teach future armor and cavalry platoon leaders stability and support operations and counterinsurgency tasks from the individual level up to the collective platoon level. These tasks include individual reflexive fire, four-man stack drills, building clearing, mounted and dismounted patrolling, checkpoint operations, conduct of raids, and many other tasks that are key to mission success in the contemporary operating environment.

The "ten-day war" that many of you conducted in the past is even more challenging and exciting. We now begin the exercise at the individual crew level then continually ramp up the level of difficulty as we transition to section and platoon-level training. The culminating event is company/team level force-on-force night operations with participation of captains from the Armor Captains Career Course (AC3). We are developing Armor platoon leaders who are trained in their branch-specific tasks and are prepared for the fight they are about to face.

The AC3 has also undergone significant revisions, which resulted from a combination of a directed redesign of all captains career courses, cancellation of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3), feedback from the Force, and discussions with leaders and commanders from Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. The loss of CAS3 allowed us to add ten days to AC3, so we thoroughly reviewed the program of instruction to ensure we stay current and relevant. We dropped task force defensive operations and a block on tactical operations center (TOC) operations and added dedicated training blocks on brigade operations; urban operations; stability operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations; and security operations.

We retained task force offensive operations and company/team offensive and defensive operations. Since the majority of students have had exposure to Force XXI battle command, brigade and below (FBCB2) systems as lieutenants, we replaced FBCB2 instruction with maneuver control system-light (MCS-L) instruction. We eliminated tactical operations (TACOPS) simulations and now use the Army standard joint conflict and tactical simulation (JCATS), which enables command and control with FBCB2 and MCS-L during all command post exercises and provides the most rigorous training available. We synchronized the AC3 graduation dates with the calendars of lifecycle managed units and the modular brigade combat team transformations to better support the Army Force Generation Model. As a result, AC3 now graduates

eight times annually, versus four times in the past.

We have not only updated the Active Component AC3, but also the Reserve Component (RC) course. Beginning this August, the RC course will run 13 months. Each course is designed to be successive, commencing with a distance learning (DL) phase, followed by the first resident phase, then a second DL phase, and finally, a second resident phase. The first two-week resident phase includes testing on the task force military decision-making process and company/team operations. The second resident phase integrates RC students into each resident course in small groups of twelve students, where they will execute brigade operations by training with a capstone brigade simulation-driven command post exercise with the Armor Pre-Command Course.

Not to be left out, the Cavalry Leaders Course and the Scout Leaders Course are adapting as well. Instruction now reflects the recent changes in reconnaissance organizations and cavalry tactics, techniques, and procedures resulting from the Army's transition to force modularity. Graduates are now prepared to operate in a heavy brigade combat team (HBCT), an infantry brigade combat team, (IBCT), or a Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) organization.

Perhaps the greatest change to the Armor Officer Education program is establishing the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) here at Fort Knox. The course begins in January 2006 and will consist of three phases. BOLC I is pre-commissioning training and includes the Reserve Officers Training Corps, the U.S. Army Military Academy, and Officer Candidate School. BOLC II is the Warrior Officer Common Training Phase in which all newly commissioned lieutenants will attend a seven-week course at Fort Knox, Kentucky, Fort Benning, Georgia, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, or Fort Bliss, Texas. Fort Knox will support eight companies of BOLC II training. BOLC III includes a 15-week basic branch training phase at Fort Knox for all Armor lieutenants.

In addition to the new program of instruction changes, all OES courses have benefited from including recent Operation Iraqi and Enduring Freedom veterans as instructors. Over 65 percent of the AOBC instructors and 75 percent of the AC3 instructors are OIF or OEF veterans. Not only are we gaining experienced new instructors, but we are sending instructors to Iraq for a month to embed with Armor units to ensure our courses are current and relevant. I encourage Armor leaders currently in Iraq to welcome these instructors.

FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT!

About the CLC and SLC

Cavalry Leaders Course

CLC is an intense three-week course focusing on reconnaissance troops, RSTA squadrons, heavy and light brigade combat team reconnaissance squadrons, doctrinal employment, and tactics/techniques/procedures (TTPs) for reconnaissance units in reconnaissance and security operations. Operations orders, practical exercises, TEWTs, and simulations (CCTT) are used to teach CLC students. CLC students spend the entire three-week course being trained to plan and execute reconnaissance and security missions with RSTA and reconnaissance organizations in the contemporary operating environment (COE).

The Armor School at Fort Knox encourages CLC enrollment for all Armor officers as well as those leaders serving in Infantry, Field Artillery, Engineer, Aviation, Military Intelligence, and Signal Corps branches, who are assigned as planners or commanders of RSTA/Cavalry organizations. All those in the above categories should seriously consider attending CLC to prepare for their assignments to or in support of RSTA and Cavalry organizations. Attendance at CLC is currently open to graduates of any officer career course with the rank of first lieutenant (promotable) through major. The course is also open to first sergeants or those serving in first sergeant positions of any reconnaissance organization. Enrollment is available through ATRRS.

Scout Leaders Course

The Scout Leaders Course (SLC) is an intense 17-day course that focuses on the fundamentals of reconnaissance at the platoon level. The course instruction is delivered in the small group environment using the conference/discussion methods, computer based training, rapid decision-making exercises, and virtual and live training scenarios. Students are expected to arrive for the course with a solid understanding of troop leading procedures, and how to plan and deliver an operations order.

SLC is designed to train and educate platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and section sergeants how to effectively lead a reconnaissance platoon. The objective of SLC is to graduate competent and confident officers and NCOs who understand the fundamentals of reconnaissance and security doctrine and the capabilities and limitations of the reconnaissance platoon in the modular force.

Course attendance is limited to the following active Army/Marine and Reserve Component commissioned officers (Armor, Infantry, Engineer, Aviation, Military Intelligence, Field Artillery): First or second lieutenants who have successfully completed the Basic Officer Leadership Course. Certain staff sergeants and sergeants first class may also attend. NCOs interested in attending the course should contact the SLC at DSN: 624-1324 to confirm their eligibility.

Additional information on these courses can be found on the Armor School's Web site at http://www.knox.army.mil/school.

TACTICAL QUESTIONING
Human Intelligence Key to Counterinsurgency Campaigns

CAPTAIN MATTHEW C. PAUL

The purpose of this article is to provide leaders and Soldiers with a quick reference of scenarios and appropriate questions to ask Iraqi citizens of three separate age groups. Intelligence is the "long pole in the tent" when prosecuting a counterinsurgency campaign. The truth is, most intelligence we receive will come from Iraqi citizens, and the only way to find it is by asking them questions. Each age group of Iraqis will respond differently, and a unique approach must be accorded to each separate age bracket. In general, American Soldiers must be cognizant of local customs and behaviors before engaging in any conversation with the local populace. In any situation always try to get the who, what, when, where, and why when questioning an individual. If you have a regular source of information, it is very important that you protect that individual's identity. If he feels threatened by giving you information, he may then choose to not cooperate. Before you conduct any operation where questioning may occur, prepare and rehearse an appropriate list of questions with your interpreter. You do not want the meaning of an important question to get lost in translation.

Begin each questioning session with an ice breaker — every situation is unique. Don't begin with, "I'd like to ask you a few questions about ...?" This will make them feel like they are being interrogated and are under suspicion of committing a crime. "Do you have a few minutes to talk with us?" might prove more productive. Then follow with, "How is your family?" Ease your way into your topic of questions and do not make the individual feel as though he is an informant or is turning his back on his family/friends/countrymen — you are simply having a "conversation" with the person.

The younger group, 8-15 year olds, will respond if the Soldiers appear nonthreatening. Break the ice by offering the children candy. Questioning can be more productive with younger children by first engaging in a conversation about a totally unrelated topic like soccer or music. Perhaps even play a brief period of soccer (football) with the kids before asking them questions. Unlike adults, you will probably have to ask children more specific and leading questions. Conversely, you will see better results from adults if you ask open-ended questions. Also, with children, pictures speak a thousand words. Try to avoid segregating younger children from the crowd to ask them questions — this will only frighten them into silence and will make them feel like they are in trouble. However, individuals of the teenage years and older should be segregated from the group when engaging in tactical questioning. The older, Iraqi group dynamic, for one reason or another, is less likely to cooperate and divulge information to you, regardless of your intentions. The information a single individual provides should not be deemed credible until it is corroborated with another source. In a semi to nonpermissive operating environment, children may prove to be the best, if not the only, credible source of information.

The middle age group, 15-30 year olds, is difficult to extract information from because most of the enemy combatants fall within this age group. If the individual you are questioning is not a combatant, he may be acquainted with those who are. Therefore, he may be less likely to divulge any information to you. Begin the questioning with a relaxed posture. Remove your sunglasses so they can see the seriousness and the sincerity in your eyes. They also need to know that you are human, not a robot hiding behind your shades.

Lance Corporal Mark E. Morrow, USMC

A Marine with the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, questions a local man during a cordon and knock operation in Saqlawiyah, Iraq, December 5, 2005.

Offer the young man a cigarette, water, or an MRE for his household. As you speak to these young men, appeal to their sense of honor and make them feel important. At this age, they are trying to build their honor and in the higher age group, they are trying to preserve it. Appeal to their future and link their future (future: job + family = honor) with the current stability of Iraq. Again, it is here, at this age, that young men learn and understand the concept of family honor. If they are suspected of being affiliated with a bad crowd who conducts bad things, tell them that you will tell their family and other families on them. Ask them what their family might think if their son goes to jail. You can do this in exchange for information. Do not ask them pointed questions like, "Have you seen any terrorists here today." "Can you help us with a problem," might yield better results. Again, their helping you makes them feel important. Do not write anything down on paper because this might scare them and cause them to shut down. Arguing with these younger individuals is OK — just be prepared to back up any argument with facts and do not lie. (There is a difference between exaggeration and flat out lying.)

Adult Iraqi men aged 30 and over usually love to talk. Ask plenty of open-ended questions. Many of the same points above often apply to this age group. Begin the conversation with an overture of generosity, i.e., offering a cigarette, etc. Or perhaps a simple compliment might work. Ask about his family (don't ask about his wife or kids specifically). Ensure that you present a relaxed, yet respectful, posture when entering a man's domain. Perhaps enter with an M-9 instead of an M-16, or perhaps remove your Kevlar before questioning the adult. Explain to him the purpose of your visit and tell him that you are stopping at all of the houses in the neighborhood — this will make him think that you are not singling him out and he will feel less threatened. This will work unless you are questioning a person of influence. If you are, you need to make him feel that he is the most powerful person in the world and you came directly to his home seeking out his assistance. A person of influence may be more eager to offer his assistance if you offer something in exchange. Although it is illegal to offer money in exchange for information, it is not illegal to link his cooperation with a Civil Affairs project that would serve both of your interests. Do not make any promises that you cannot keep! If an improvised explosive device (IED) or an assassination occurred in the area, or if there was an unfortunate event resulting in collateral damage, for example, explain to them exactly what happened and why. This will help with our IO campaign and will allow us to disseminate our version of the story (the truth) before the insurgents/terrorists disseminate theirs. As you question an adult/older man, appeal to his sense of honor and try to link his cooperation with the preservation/strengthening of his and his family's honor. Also, appeal to his children/ grandchildren, their future, and their likelihood of a positive future in an unstable Iraq. Then link their cooperation with U.S. forces to a more stable and secure environment for them and their families. If a parent's child may be a combatant, do not directly accuse him or his children of any wrongdoing — this may insult him and cause him to shut down. "I know your son is a terrorist," is probably not the best choice of words. "We think your son might be taking up with a bad crowd," might prove more

A U.S. Soldier uses a translator to question a local man from Hasawa, Iraq, about insurgent activity in the area.

productive. If you are a parent, attempt to empathize with the difficulties of raising children. Adults will know their neighborhood — word of mouth is huge in Iraq. They will know if any outsiders (Jihadists) have infiltrated his neighborhood. Ask him if anyone has recently rented property in the neighborhood. Much of the Iraqi real estate is controlled by tribes — tribal sheiks will surely know if an outsider is renting on his tribe's property. Before engaging in an operation, ensure you fully understand the dynamics of your AO. You need to know of feuding clans/tribes in the area and any other rivalries that may discredit any information you receive from those individuals questioned. Many Iraqis have an agenda. They may offer you erroneous information as a way to exact revenge on their enemies. When genuine complaints and grievances are made by adults, it is OK to agree with them but attempt to explain the reason why those unfortunate events occurred. For example, a Soldier at a traffic control point destroys a vehicle full of innocent noncombatants. You may want to cite that the Soldier is only a scared young man, only 18 years old, who only two days prior saw his best friend blown apart by a vehicle-borne IED.

An individual's nonverbal responses to your questioning are just as valuable as his verbal ones. As you ask questions and as you dig deeper and deeper into the individual being questioned, take note of his physical expressions and his body language. Look

for yawning, excessive fixation on a part of his body, wiping hands, profuse sweating, failure to make eye contact, shaking, or his body or a body part cannot remain still. These are signs that he is either lying or is hiding something from you. Continue to probe until he reveals the information that you may be looking for — akin to the escalation of force, gradually escalate the level of aggressiveness of your questioning the more likely it seems the individual questioned is refusing to cooperate because he is involved in illegal/anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) activity. However, this may not work in every situation — every person will respond differently. He may be innocent and is just simply scared to talk to you. Ask permission to search him, ask to view his identification and write his name down, and ask to photograph him. Even if he does not turn out to be a confirmed AIF operator or conspirator, if nothing else, it will make him think that he is being monitored and will deter him from future insurgent activity.

Close the "conversation" with a compliment like, "You have been a huge help to us, thank you." Again, make them feel like they are important and are contributing greatly to the cause of peace and security in their neighborhood. But do not make them feel as though they are informants unless they freely offer to become one for you. Do not close with, "Can I come back to your home to get more information from you," or "I would like to get more information from you in the future, as long as it won't place your life at risk." "I enjoyed our conversation; I hope I can talk with you again if it won't cause you any inconvenience," is a better alternative.

The scenarios that follow will illustrate recommended actions following a particular attack. It is important to note that you should not make it a matter of practice to wait to talk to the populace until after you have been attacked. Once you pattern the enemy's behavior through past attacks and through the gathering of information, you can determine where he is likely to strike and how, where he lives, eats, worships, etc. Once you have a workable template, you can put boots on the ground and begin tactical questioning, before the attack occurs. Being proactive can work in any scenario.

SCENARIO # 1 – IED ATTACK

A roadside IED has just detonated in your AO against a U.S. vehicle convoy. Your patrol is dispatched to the area to conduct an investigation and determine who was responsible. Just like civilian police do at a crime scene, either begin your investigation from ground zero and work your way out in concentric circles or conduct a grid investigation by assigning small units to search/investigate a particular sector of the grid. Maintain a heightened sense of alert because a secondary device or a small arms ambush may be waiting for you as you arrive. Any information you receive may result in enough actionable intelligence to seek out and apprehend other members of the IED network. Intelligence drives operations.

Possible Questions

AGE 8-15

Did you see any men with shovels in the area today or last night?

Did you see any men with cell phones or binoculars in the area near the blast?

Have you seen anyone carrying these in the area (show pictures of IEDs)?

Have you seen any more of these in the neighborhood?

Have you seen any men with guns in the area?

Do you go to school?

Where?

Why are you not there?

AGE 15-30

What can you tell me about the explosion?

Where were you during the explosion?

What did you see?

Do you know who might be responsible?

Have you seen anything out of the ordinary in the last 24 hours?

What is your occupation?

Follow up with questions about why he is not at his job, if he is gainfully employed. Or, if he is a student, why he is not at school.

If he fits the profile of an IED emplacer/executer, and through verbal and nonverbal responses to your questions he seems suspicious, ask to gain permission to search him from head to toe. Check and record his name depicted on his ID and look for hidden remote detonation devices or magnification devices.

If you have cause to believe he is an enemy combatant, search the man's car & house (his entire property to include a front and back yard). Ask his parents questions. By his detention, they may be shamed into answering your questions and provide you with information, especially if they believe it will result in leniency with their son.

AGE 30+

In addition to the types of questions above, you can ask:

Did you hear the explosion — it must have given you quite a scare?

We think that some boys in this neighborhood may be responsible? What do you think?

Have you witnessed anything unusual in the neighborhood in the last 48 hours?

Do you know of any Iraqi citizens who have been killed or injured by roadside bombs?

Do you fear for your children?

I don't see any honor in killing innocent Iraqis, do you?

You know the quicker we can secure this neighborhood, the quicker we can go home?

What can we both do to deter the neighborhood boys from getting involved with IEDs?

SCENARIO # 2 – MORTAR/SNIPER ATTACK

The following list of questions can apply to either sniper or mortar attack situations:

A sniper has just engaged a member of your patrol and you conduct a search/investigation of the surrounding area.

-or-

A mortar barrage has just landed in the FOB and the Q-37 provides you with an 8-digit grid coordinate located inside a populated area within the AO. Your patrol is dispatched to investigate.

In either case, you should move from ground zero in either concentric circles or use a grid search technique. Stopping civilians and asking them questions as well as knocking on doors are good techniques to gather intelligence. Maintain a heightened sense of alert. Think about force protection at all times — your reaction may be exactly how the enemy wants you to react.

AGE 8-15
Have you seen anything that resembles this (show picture of a common mortar or rifle)?
Did you hear a loud boom?
Where did the noise come from?
Can you take us there?
Did you hear a gunshot recently?
Where did the noise come from?
Can you take us there?

AGE 15 & OLDER
In addition to the types of questions in the previous IED scenario and in the younger age group in the current scenario ask:

We are knocking on all of the doors in the neighborhood to see if anyone can help us with the crime (constantly reiterate the fact that targeting coalition forces is a crime) problem in this neighborhood, would you be willing to offer us your assistance?

We want to try to put an end to the disturbance caused by these misguided boys, can you help us?

These criminals are placing this neighborhood and your families in danger; can you help us put a stop to it?

What can we do to prevent this from happening in the future? What would you recommend?

Do you know that Americans view being attacked by mortarmen/snipers as cowardly, and not worthy of honor? (use sparingly)

Do you know that many of the mortar explosions result in the death of an innocent Iraqi?

What does the Koran say about killing innocent people? (use sparingly)

How would you feel if the men firing the mortars and killing innocent Iraqis ran this country? (use if he is confrontational or a known enemy sympathizer)

Do you think they can provide you and your family with a future?

Do you think they can get you a good job?

Do you think they can protect your family?

A Soldier with the Virginia National Guard's 3rd Battalion, 116th Infantry Regiment, questions a villager through an interpreter during a patrol in the Ghazni Province of Afghanistan.

Staff Sergeant Joseph P. Collins, Jr.

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The Need for a New Cargo HMMWV

CAPTAIN TIMOTHY F. WRIGHT

As part of the current Army transformation, every light infantry brigade is undergoing a massive overhaul of task organization and equipment to become the new Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), a fighting force capable of conducting full-spectrum operations from high intensity conflicts to stability and support operations. The IBCT's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) is a significant improvement over the previous organization, but it fails to provide a survivable, tactical vehicle to its maneuver units, despite the proof of such a vehicle's worth in the streets Baghdad and in the mountains of Afghanistan. These battlefields have demonstrated the need for infantry companies and platoons to cover longer distances and operate further from their headquarters and support structures than ever before. To meet these needs, the Army must develop and field a variant on the M1114 up-armored HMMWV (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) with the ability to move a squad, carry its equipment, and protect it until the squad can dismount and execute its assigned mission.

Task Force 2-27 (2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment), as a part of 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, deployed in March 2004 to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Orgun-E, located in Afghanistan's Paktika Province. Paktika shares a mountainous border to the east and south with Pakistan, and the province is dominated by ridgelines that vary in elevation between 6,000 and 12,000 feet above sea level. The roughly 300,000 people in the province live in small, tribal villages with minimal infrastructure, no paved roads, no plumbing, no electrical grid, and few government or police systems. Aside from diesel engines, a small number of satellite telephones and basic electronics imported from Pakistan, there is little difference between Paktika in 2004 and Paktika in 1004. Given its remote location, its proximity to the border (and the region in Pakistan where many believed some of the major Al-Qaeda leadership were and are still hiding) and that it holds the dubious honor of being dubbed the "most evilest place on earth" by Colonel Rodney Davis in *Time* Magazine, it was taken as fact that TF 2-27 was deploying to a place where the operational focus would be on finding, capturing, or killing the enemy that was reputedly hiding in the hills, looking to kill Americans.

This scenario was far from reality. The operations that TF 2-27 conducted for a year in Paktika evolved from kinetic, enemy-focused operations to non-kinetic, population-focused operations, marking a dramatic shift away from conventional light infantry tactics and operations towards stability and support operations. For the first two months, the task force conducted three-to-four-day operations, acting on intelligence gathered locally and pushed down from higher levels, to identify and capture Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and foreign fighters whom most people assumed were in the province. During these operations, the task force searched compounds, patrolled mountains, and discovered caves that were supposed waypoints on the infiltration routes the enemy was using. These were the traditional light infantry operations that the Soldiers and leaders of TF 2-27 expected to be conducting, and, with a few notable exceptions, they were largely ineffective. For all the time and resources expended, a disproportionately small

Photos by Specialist Gul A. Alisan

Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment leave on a mission to Orgun-E, Afghanistan, in April 2004.

number of "terrorists" or foreign fighters were found, and units spent more time attempting to mend fences with the villages that they searched than they did fighting the enemy.

TF 2-27 was also responsible for assisting the new governor of the province, Gulab Mangal, in establishing a legitimate and effective provincial government, one that would set the conditions for the first democratic presidential election in October 2004. After the first two months in the province, the task force commander, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Piatt, and Governor Mangal developed a plan that would support these objectives. TF 2-27, in conjunction with the governor and his provincial police, would travel to all 23 districts in the province in three separate operations, addressing the districts' reconstruction needs, making them aware of the upcoming elections, and laying the groundwork for voter registration. The response to these operations was enormously positive, yielding more cooperation from the population, better intelligence on the insurgency, and greater security throughout the area of operations (AO). Operations of this type became the main effort of the battalion. The task force found that by demonstrating that the provincial government and U.S. forces were working together to bring security and stability to their lives, the support the insurgents had previously enjoyed from the population had eroded, isolating and marginalizing the enemy by eliminating his logistical, monetary, and security networks. This profound change occurred across Afghanistan throughout 2004, and traditional light infantry tactics and missions were replaced with full-spectrum operations that focused on reconstruction, government development, training national and local police, and helping the Afghan National Army become a professional force.

The nature of the conflict changed, and we found ourselves, for the first time, successfully fighting an insurgency.

While this shift is well-documented, the implications of this shift have yet to be addressed. To be able to focus our efforts on the population, the task force had to get its maneuver forces to where the people lived. Unfortunately, for a light infantry unit, nothing was within walking distance. Paktika is 19,101 square kilometers, with over 600 kilometers of border with Pakistan. The "box" at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the Army's premier light infantry training area, is approximately 800 square kilometers, only about one-sixth of which is used by a light infantry battalion during a rotation. According to the MTOE, the primary maneuver forces in a light infantry battalion, the rifle companies, have no internal transportation assets. The only vehicles it has are assigned to headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and consists of approximately 40 cargo HMMWVs which are used to transport the battalion headquarters, staff, specialty platoons, and limited supplies across the battlefield. This lack of vehicles presented a significant problem for missions that demanded rifle companies and platoons to move hundreds of miles for weeks at a time. Anticipating this sort of challenge prior to deployment, the battalion reorganized and deployed 27 organic HMMWVs, and once in theater, the task force signed for more vehicles that had become installation equipment from previous rotations. The task force signed for approximately 25 M1114, up-armored, five-person models, most less than three years old with improved engines, suspensions, and drive trains. To supplement these gun trucks, the task force also signed for approximately 65 M998, M1038, and other miscellaneous unarmored cargo models, capable of carrying up to 11 Soldiers, their weapons, and supplies. These vehicles, as well as the 27 from Hawaii, had an average age of 15 years and had no improvements to the major stock components. These cargo versions were modified with Kevlar blankets and sheeting to improve survivability, and units strapped M240B machine guns on tripods to the top of the vehicle's cab to create a makeshift weapons platform. With a hodgepodge collection of tactical vehicles, TF 2-27 became motorized.

While creating a fleet of vehicles for the mission in Paktika and motorizing TF 2-27 worked, it was far from ideal. The cargo HMMWV, which made up well over half of the vehicles used by the maneuver elements in the task force, was never meant to be a tactical troop carrier, and its use as such had a variety of disadvantages. The number of vehicles assigned to each company, between six to eight M1114s and 10-15 cargo variants, required companies and platoons to put an average of 10 Soldiers in a cargo variant, and the limited space in the cargo area made carrying the necessary food, water, parts, and equipment to sustain operations challenging at best. The lack of room in the cargo space made firing weapons or defending the vehicle difficult as well.

Companies and platoons attempted to mitigate this problem by securing their automatic weapons on tripods to the top of the vehicle, but accurate, controlled fire was almost impossible to achieve, and that fire could only be directed forward due to the limitations placed on the gunner's movement by the configuration

> **Maintenance on any piece of equipment is important to ensure that it works when it is needed. It is especially true with vehicles ...**

of the truck. Intended for operation in rear areas, there were no provisions for survivability of the operator, truck commander, or its occupants in the cargo area. Kevlar blankets, Kevlar sheets, and add-on armor kits saved many lives and improved the survivability immensely, but overall, the trucks could not handle the role as a tactical troop carrier.

The maximum load for a HMMWV, no matter what configuration, is 2,500 pounds. A cargo variant, with 10 Soldiers, their equipment, supplies for four days of operations (the average mission conducted by task force patrols), and the minimum Kevlar protection, carried a load of 3,830 pounds, or 153 percent of its maximum capacity. A cargo HMMWV, with an add-on armor kit, carried 4,530 lbs, or 183 percent of its maximum capacity. These numbers, while shockingly large, still do not account for the added weight of special equipment, such as mortar systems and their associated ammunition, and weight added by supplies for longer patrols.

Paktika Province, as mentioned before, had no paved roads, and this compounded the problems created by the weight demands. Patrols averaged a movement rate of approximately 15 miles an hour. Short stretches of moving at normal speeds were broken up by conditions that demanded vehicles inch along, crawling over rocks, holes, and obstacles that would have stretched an empty HMMWV to the limits of it capabilities. In these inhospitable conditions, operations demanded that the 15-year-old vehicles cover greater distances in shorter periods of time than ever before. The HMMWVs averaged 1,000 miles a month, while the cargo vehicles that deployed with the task force had previously averaged only 2,000 miles a year.

All of these demands on the cargo vehicles had an expected result: they were incapable of completing the mission. In a sample month with average vehicle usage, the task force mechanics replaced 10 differentials, 16 cross members, and a constant stream of shocks, control arms, and half-shafts. More than one cargo truck had its rear wheel wells and side panels literally fall off from the wear and tear of its use as a tactical vehicle. Throughout the deployment, the battalion maintained an average operational readiness (OR) rate of only 65 percent. This figure includes the M1114 trucks which, on average, were 13-15 years younger and fared much better than their cargo counterparts.

It is worth noting that the battalion also maintained a small number of light medium tactical vehicles (LMTVs) in Paktika, and they were the least used vehicles in the task force. These trucks were unable to safely negotiate moderately difficult terrain, getting stuck easily and posing a roll-over threat with their high center of gravity. They were a large target, and hardening the cargo area, while possible, did not offer much protection. An LMTV with two squads in the back was a large target and a disproportionately high concentration of combat power. Finally, there were no assets in the province that could recover the vehicle in the event that it broke down. The LMTVs were useful in moving supplies around the firebase and in the rear areas, but that was the extent of their employment. They were not useful tactical vehicles.

Another problem with reorganizing as a motorized battalion when TF 2-27 arrived in Paktika was the lack of tactical and

technical training and experience with vehicles throughout the task force. Though the battalion was a well-trained infantry unit, there was a significant dearth of experience working as a mounted force. The task force lacked qualified drivers and qualified M2 and Mk19 gunners, and few, if any, had conducted a mounted live-fire exercise. As with most infantry tasks, this lack of experience could have been overcome had the task force had vehicles to train with prior to deployment. Although there are a limited number of vehicles in a light infantry battalion, it was not possible to get every company trained in mounted tactics prior to our departure. Once in Paktika, the tactical learning curve was steep, but the battalion accepted a large amount of risk in the first month, using vehicles that the operators were just not trained to use. The technical learning curve was not as steep, and it had greater long-term effect. Maintenance on any piece of equipment is important to ensure that it works when it is needed. It is especially true with vehicles, and that truth is magnified when those vehicles are operating in the conditions mentioned above. Trained vehicle operators are taught to inspect the vehicle before every use, monitor its condition during operation, and check the vehicle every time it stops. The majority of the Soldiers operating vehicles

did not receive formal training on the maintenance required for a HMMWV, and this had a major impact on the vehicles. In the first month, operator errors resulted in vehicles breaking down at an extremely high rate. Simple mistakes such as failing to tighten loose half-shaft bolts before operation and putting the wrong kind of fuel in the engine were common, and these mistakes could have been avoided with proper training prior to deployment. Had the rifle companies spent even one month with their vehicles prior to deployment, many of the problems the task force experienced could have been avoided.

The third major problem faced by TF 2-27 operating as a motorized unit was the lack of a combat service support system that could support the number of vehicles operating in the conditions of Paktika. The task force arrived in Paktika with four organizational-level vehicle mechanics who were initially responsible for close to 100 vehicles, armed with only their personal tool boxes and a place to work. Additionally, the unit was authorized only 53 different types of parts to have on hand, or lines of prescribed load list (PLL). The task force was terribly undermanned and under supported trying to maintain such a large number of vehicles in the conditions of Paktika. The mechanics worked literally from sunrise to sunset (and beyond) seven days a week, yet it was

impossible to keep the trucks running.

Part of the problem was the institutional mind-set at higher levels that parts, mechanics, and tools could be maintained at the brigade level and surged forward as needed, or worse, the broken vehicles could be evacuated to the rear to be fixed. For example, an M1114 was deadlined because it lacked enough power to drive up hills. The mechanics determined that it needed a new engine, a direct support maintenance fix, so the vehicle was evacuated to Bagram Airbase, the next higher level of maintenance support. The vehicle did not return to the FOB for 60 days. The task force was using a maintenance system designed to support a light infantry battalion that traditionally had to worry about little more than a broken rifle, and it could not adapt to support the maintenance needs of more than 100 vehicles located a two-day drive away. Great credit is due to Captain Patrick Soule and Staff Sergeant Isaias Villanueva, who worked tirelessly to redesign the system to support the task force. They personally developed a maintenance plan that could support the needs of the task force. At its most robust, just prior to redeployment, the task force had both organizational and direct support mechanics, two motor pools, 183 lines of PLL, and had enough tools to run a full-service shop. An M1114 that used to take 60 days to get a new engine could now be fully mission capable in 48 hours. As with the rest of the difficulties faced by TF 2-27,

Soldiers and leaders invented creative solutions to solve problems and accomplish missions, but the system was so broken that no matter how successful the task force was at collecting intelligence, working with the population or finding the enemy, the lack of a sustainable tactical vehicle fleet and a system to support it resulted in enemy weaknesses that went unexploited and casualties that could have been avoided.

A significant change has already begun to fix some of these problems. The Army is currently reorganizing all light, air assault, and airborne units into IBCTs. This reorganization of the Army from division-centric units to brigade-centric units is a significant change in the task organization of combat, combat support, and combat service support assets intended to make the Army more flexible, deployable, and adaptable to today's battlefield. Infantry battalions will be more robust, adding a forward support company and a weapons company. The forward support company is commanded by a Quartermaster, Transportation, or Ordnance officer who controls a maintenance platoon, a transportation platoon (consisting primarily LMTVs), and a recovery section. By placing these assets under the direct control of the battalion commander, an infantry battalion has a much better chance of being able to handle the maintenance requirements that operations in a stability and support environment demand. Just as in Paktika, the assets will be located forward so that the battalion can fix the faults and get the vital equipment back into the fight. The weapons company is another positive change to the system, as it is essentially a motorized company organic to the battalion. The Soldiers in that company will be able to train at home station to accomplish the tasks that a stability and support environment will demand, i.e. the ability to conduct tactical operations over great distances while being able to maintain the equipment used in that environment.

Unfortunately, while the new IBCT takes steps in the right direction, it fails in two major respects. First, there are still not enough tactical vehicles in the MTOE to facilitate the projection of the battalion's combat power over the distances that stability and support operations demand. Second, the vehicles that are assigned to an IBCT are not capable of accomplishing the mission. The weapons company is undoubtedly a step in the right direction, providing at least one company the ability to move over great distances without external support, but the rifle companies are still under-equipped with just two cargo HMMWVs.

TF 2-27's experience in Afghanistan clearly demonstrates that rifle companies must be able to project combat power in a stability and support environment, but unless that need is met with an updated MTOE, units will continue to be unprepared and untrained on the equipment that they will use in a combat environment. At the very least, inexperienced or untrained operators will cause unnecessary wear and tear on the vehicles that will reduce the operational readiness rate of the IBCT. At the worst, Soldiers unaccustomed to operating the vehicles and weapons in a motorized unit will become injured or killed as they attempt to learn the basics in combat rather than in training. Both of these scenarios could be fixed with the proper equipment.

In addition to the lack of vehicles in general, the vehicles that are a part of the IBCT MTOE are the wrong vehicles. All of the HMMWVs are variants on the M998 cargo model, exactly the same vehicles that proved to be woefully inadequate in a tactical role by TF 2-27. It cannot handle the wear and tear of combat patrolling; it has no provision for securing itself or the formation it moves in; and, as a stock vehicle, it has no survivability. Modifications can be made to improve these deficiencies; however, the modifications place such great demands of the vehicle, exceeding its design parameters, that they cannot be accepted as a viable course of action.

The problem is theoretically easy to fix, but the actual implementation will take resources and funds that are already in short supply. The M1114 has proved to be a reliable tactical vehicle. It is durable, survivable, and capable of providing a weapons platform to secure the formations it which it moves. The Army must continue to improve, produce, and distribute this platform to its IBCTs as a primary tactical vehicle, and it must be added to the IBCT MTOE to allow units to become proficient in its application and maintenance before they arrive in a combat theater.

As viable as this vehicle is, it possesses some inherent weaknesses. Only five Soldiers can patrol in the vehicle. For a 38-man platoon with attachments, that means nine vehicles are needed just to move everyone. When it is time to get out and conduct infantry operations, a platoon of M1114s loses a minimum of 19 Soldiers to vehicle security (driver and gunner per vehicle and one additional leader for command and control). This greatly reduces the commander's combat power by fixing almost half of his platoon in a support role. Even if the remaining Soldiers provide enough combat power to get out and fight, should they need to immediately stop and dismount, the platoon will be spread out in groups of three over several hundred meters. In this situation, command and control in an M1114 would be significantly reduced, especially if in contact with the enemy. Finally, overall situational awareness is reduced by the lack of visibility out of the M1114, potentially adding to an already confusing situation.

It has been suggested that the Army tap into stockpiles of M113 armored personnel carriers to address its vehicle needs. While it would be an inexpensive alternative, the characteristics of the vehicle are unsuited to the current operational situation. With a maximum speed of 45 miles per hour, it lacks the mobility of a HMMWV-type vehicle. The tracked carrier already has a reputation for lagging behind the mechanized forces with which it habitually operates. While it has some armor protection, it is still less survivable than the M1114. There are much greater maintenance demands on an M113-equipped unit compared to one using trucks, and it is nearly impossible to recover an M113 with another M113. Most importantly, a flat tire can be fixed in five minutes with a trained squad, while a track change pushes five hours for an M113. If M113s were used in a small area of operations with even terrain and were supported by a unit with robust maintenance systems, it would be a viable option. Unfortunately, that environment is rare on today's battlefield.

The Army must develop a cargo variant of the M1114 that allows for the tactical movement of squad-sized elements in a durable, survivable, and securable platform across great distances and for long periods of time. The improved engine, suspension, and drivetrain can handle the demands placed on a tactical vehicle that a cargo HMMWV cannot. It is more mobile and recoverable than the ungainly LMTV. It is simple to become proficient in its use and maintenance, a distinct advantage over the newer wheeled vehicles such as the Stryker or its equivalent from another country. The only U.S. vehicle in current use that approaches filling this need is the Ground Mobility Vehicle (GMV) found in many Special Operations Forces units. It has the improved engine, suspension, and drivetrain of the M1114, but it lacks the stock survivability.

The Army must replace the current tactical vehicles in the IBCT with command and cargo models of the M1114. Each rifle platoon will need two M1114s for the platoon headquarters and four M1114 cargos (one per squad) to project combat power across the battlefield while maintaining the command and control needed to be able to quickly transition into dismounted light infantry operations. A company, with vehicles for the headquarters section, requires seven M1114s and 14 M1114 cargos. The identification of this need is simple, but developing, mass producing, and fielding a new HMMWV variant while continuing to produce M1114s to meet the current need is not. Currently, the vast majority of all M1114s are sent immediately to Iraq and Afghanistan to sustain the forces currently fighting in those operations. While this system ensures that the proverbial tip of the spear is receiving the best and newest equipment, it is a stopgap at best. To truly support the infantrymen and the battles that they will fight, production of the M1114 must be exponentially increased, and a new cargo M1114 must be fielded to ensure continued mission success now and in the future.

Given the current and projected world situation, where few nations have militaries that would even entertain the thought of engaging the United States in a conventional fight, stability and support operations will be the most common operations that the Army will conduct. It is imperative that the lessons learned in places like Paktika Province, Afghanistan, are applied to current organizations and doctrine to ensure the Army continues to be the most effective fighting force in the world.

Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division's 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment pass through a valley during a mission in Orgun-E, Afghanistan.

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Patrol-Based Infantry Doctrine

WILLIAM F. OWEN

"The infantryman has to use initiative and intelligence in almost every step he moves, every action he takes on the battlefield. We ought therefore to put our men of best intelligence and endurance into the Infantry."

Field Marshal Earl Wavell
First published in *The Times*, Thursday, April 19, 1945

The purpose of this article is to describe an alternate tactical doctrine, training, and organization for light infantry units and subunits. The intended purpose of presenting an alternative is not to criticize current or existing concepts, but to aid thought and understanding by showing an alternative that may have some positive merit, if correctly understood and applied.

Before examining patrol-based infantry doctrine (PBID) in detail, it is necessary to explain what it is not.

First, it is not an entirely original idea. It is in fact a collection of concepts that have been brought together because each individual idea or technique has a strong, logical, and coherent relationship with another. Many of the parts have been or are regularly practiced in the normal course of operations or training. The aim of bringing them together is to build from those logical and coherent relationships in order to maximize the effectiveness of light infantry units.

Second, it is nothing to do with Special Forces. Current fashionable obsessions with SF, and the ill-conceived promotion of certain formations as being uniquely tactically proficient, have led to what little amount of useful alternate infantry thought there is in the United Kingdom being labeled as "SF tactics" and thus suffering from all the less-than-positive understanding that brings. With the exception of some specialist roles, Special Forces are arguably a light infantry formation, and it is that iteration of their operational techniques, which some aspects of PBI replicate.

Related to this, a short history lesson of infantry may be instructive. Close order infantry battles in the 19th century saw the emergence of riflemen, skirmishers, and sharp shooters fighting in a dispersed fashion and often employing field craft. By the early 20th century, this was often characterized as "Boer tactics" in respect of the tactics employed by Afrikaners fighting the British. The open order tactics that developed from the 1870s onward were found to be woefully inadequate for the operational conditions of World War I. These tactical concepts developed into the basis of what modern infantry tactics are today. Starting in about the late 1930s and continuing throughout the 1940s, a parallel course of development began, which culminated in various types of Special Forces, or specialist light infantry units. Often called raider battalions, commandos or rangers, these units were given considerable leeway to develop their own tactical doctrine. Indeed, the U.S. Marine Corps cherry-picked a large part of what was developed in the Raider battalions for use in regular USMC battalions. Large elements of tactical teaching currently employed in modern armies are traceable to their origin in Special Forces. The utility of some of the techniques developed in SF is that they have

grown from what works and not what is taught, because SF have been free to develop such techniques without interference. Taking all this into account, it would seem possible that we have for a time been moving from the age of the "post close order infantry" to "patrol-based infantry."

PBID essentially suggests that you train, organize, and operate light infantry in a way that best utilizes their inherent strengths. In practice, this means that you train infantry to accomplish two basic tasks, these being a reconnaissance patrol and an observation post. These two core skills are built on a high level of individually developed field-craft skills. In simplistic but easily understood terms, you train Soldiers as snipers and then train them as a recce platoon.

Why? Surely this is completely against the teaching that only the brightest, best, and most experienced of infantry unit Soldiers become snipers and members of the recce platoons. If the first core function is "find" and the most intangible qualifier of success in operations is information, then "recce-centric" infantry may well be extremely useful. Critical to understanding what is advocated here is the point that this is suggested as the benchmark for all light infantry units, not just specialist recce formations.

Both the reality of current operations as well as the future of warfare and conflict is arguably "light infantry centric." Only light forces can confront all possible adversaries across the spectrum of operations. Correctly trained, equipped and resourced, they can destroy, dislocate and attrite armored formations, as well as engage criminal/terrorist gangs in a complex urban or rural environment.

The often-raised criticism that light infantry are inherently vulnerable because they lack protected mobility, is only a perception borne of the limiting tactical thought that defines a unit by the method they use for mobility, be it airborne, Marine, mechanized or armor. A light infantry Soldier can use a landing craft, helicopter, armored personnel carrier (APC) or mechanized infantry combat vehicle (MICV), without detracting from his light role utility.

Correctly selected, trained, equipped and motivated, the light infantryman is cost effective, rapidly deployable, and flexible. The ability to achieve the missions likely to be demanded of militaries by societies and governments will call for well-educated Soldiers being able to operate in increasingly isolated and complex situations. The barely post-conscript training doctrines prevalent in the world today are ill suited to future operations. The drill, boot and bayonet approach is already at the limits of what it can usefully contribute. We can no longer afford to constantly add to the layers of process and TTPs (tactics, techniques and procedures) to address the training that complex situations demand. Good light infantry may well have to prosecute a three-block war, that has none of the clear distinction that General Krulak's legendary analogy provided. The future light infantryman may well find himself fighting and handing out aid at the same time! How useful is it to view peacekeeping as something requiring training distinct from anti-armor operations? While obviously concerned with different threats, recent operations have shown that you may have

> "There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order."
> NICCOLO MACHIAVEILLI,
> First published in
> *The Prince*, 1513

to go from anti-armor operations to peacekeeping in less than an hour. Forces configured and trained for only one type of warfare are at a distinct disadvantage. What is needed is a coherent and logical approach to terrain, technology, tactics, training, and threat. What defeats an enemy in the jungle is exactly the same as that which defeats him on urban terrain. All the fundamentals are identical and the only difference comes in some detail of TTPs, that all have to be applied in a context specific to the operation. Popular military myth seeks to characterize the urban environment as vastly demanding. What actually makes urban terrain a challenge, in the context of modern operations, is the civil population. This should be self evident to any Soldier educated to that fact. Civil populations could also be present in contested jungle or forest areas due to a refugee crisis or ethnic cleansing.

To face these challenges, PBID requires a doctrine that is cognizant of them. The doctrine that is envisaged here is what is taught. It is the education you give to your Soldiers. For example he is taught how to apply the core functions of "find, fix, strike, and exploit." The default setting is not enemy armor formation smashing or attack bunkers in general war, because there is no default setting. Conflict is a spectrum of conditions. He is also taught to create and apply "fire and maneuver effects" as in surprise, shock, suppression and isolation across the spectrum of conflict employing rules of engagement (ROEs). He is also educated in tactical dichotomies such as security versus activity, and directive command versus restrictive command. From this grows an understanding that nothing on operations is absolute and judgement is critical, as it is in anyone's normal life.

Education is central to training patrol-based infantry. This doesn't mean you need Soldiers with high academic standards. Rather it is just basic common sense. He must be able to understand and apply concepts as about as complex as those we require of policemen or skilled trades working on building sites. It is not the role of a modern volunteer army to act as social security for those with nowhere else to go. The PB Soldier must be a robust and determined individual, with a useable level of common sense, and arguably some modern armies do contain a significant percentage of such men, and even women.

A PB Soldier is taught to navigate and live in the field as an individual. He is required to accomplish tests of navigation in both urban and rural terrain, possibly utilizing not just conventional maps but also aerial photographs and sketches. He must prove himself reliant when isolated and he must achieve a useable basic level of first aid and NBC skills. He is taught individual field craft and stalking in much the same way snipers are traditionally trained, and ultimately, he is taught to shoot under field rather than range conditions. Shooting is always applied in relationship to ROEs and under simulated operational conditions. For example, the ability to engage small limited exposure targets at varying ranges from the standing or crouched position would be emphasized over prone grouping at 100 meters, and simulation would seem to promise significant benefits in this regard. This

Tech Sergeant John M. Foster, USAF

A PB soldier is taught to navigate and live in the field as an individual.

would include both Smart Ranges and the adaptation of TESEX (Tactical Engagement Simulation) type equipment.

Antipathetic to PBI is the didactic "this is the way you do it" training commonly utilized by some armies. The PB Soldier is told what the required end or operating state is, and then shown examples and common errors. He is then free to create his own solutions under critique and guidance from instructors.

Once the PB infantryman has graduated from individual training, having been assessed by an independent examiner, he advances to his patrol training.

Patrol training is based on operating as part of a three-to-five-man fireteam to accomplish reconnaissance patrols and observation posts. Again, this is taught in the context of both conventional warfighting and anti-terrorist or peacekeeping scenarios in all types of terrain. The aim of the training is to get each fireteam to develop a range of SOPs under the guidance of instructors, and for those SOPs to flow from simple rapid and eventually intuitive decisions, rather than mindlessly and didactically applied drills. Each team member is also given the chance to plan and lead patrols so that those with NCO and officer potential can be identified early on.

When teams can demonstrate the required level of competence and experience, they are brought together to form multiples of three-to-five fireteams working together or under the control of a headquarters team. They then train together as a multiple of varying size, dependent on the task. This is really very simple, bearing in mind what they have done so far. For example, an ambush is really just a series of OPs. All the routines required have been previously perfected. Likewise, a multiple harbor is just a collection of observation posts (OPs), arranged in the way that best uses terrain and control. This even extends up to the layout and routine of defensive positions.

Offensive operations are merely outgrowths and adaptations of what has already been previously learned as contact drills. For example, a point team makes contact, and teams two and three will either go left flanking to isolate and suppress the enemy or will move to cut off his escape. This is dependant on context and biased to the required choice of either teams firing or teams moving, plus a reserve and exploitation element. Again, Soldiers or NCOs under training are not told, "This is the way you must do it!" They are taught a raft of techniques and concepts that generate effects both on the enemy and

themselves. In fact such offensive action by multiple fireteams has been both widely discussed and subject to trials by the UK and in the case of the trials proved largely successful. From this flows a reduction in process. You don't have to mark and secure lines of departure if your fireteams can locate an already occupied final rendezvous point (FRV)/OP where they are told, "Go 50 meters to the left on a bearing of 185. Enemy is bearing 275. Stand by to move on my command."

Lastly, teams can progress to being the basis for manning support weapons such as guided weapons or sustained fire machine guns. Thus, dependant on threat, multiples can contain teams with a variety of weapons systems.

Dependant on the basic level of physical fitness on entry, the total training time is something less than 12 weeks for someone with no infantry experience.

Critical to PBI is finding the right man, and it is more critical today than ever before. Western armies are small, meaning that force densities are almost always low. The extremely promising emerging concept of "distributed operations" may well see small light infantry units initiating and cueing effects, in situations where the operational objectives are constantly shifting and ambiguous. The actions of a very few will therefore have far wider ranging impact than before and conventional military success will not always lie with the conventionally militarily successful. Societies' and politicians' peculiar expectations of conflict and armed force conspire against the purely military mass based solution. The "strategic corporal" must cease being a figure of comforting myth and be born into actual existence, lest his less-than-able colleagues are ever recorded beating someone to death unaware that they are live on a satellite news channel!

While recruiting seeks to attract officers who are the brightest and the best, by fast tracking them past the banality of life in the ranks and straight to a life in the

officers' mess, no such imperative seems to exist for placing a man of similar ambition or potential to serve as a Soldier or NCO. PBI would demand a high caliber of determined individual, and he would have to be subject to some form of nonphysical fitness-based selection, such as being able to perform tasks that require a degree of physical courage, such as a civilian parachute jump. Why would any army want an infantry man that could not accomplish something 17-year-old school girls seem to manage with ease in two days, and if left in the hands of approved civilian organizations is cheap and easy to accomplish? That, combined with such techniques as psychometric testing and, of course, milling should be ample!

PBI also comprises other critical elements. Load carrying and the choice of fireteam weapons are not explicitly recommended in PBI, but principles to exist based on both historical and operational analysis. The need for a fireteam to achieve both active and passive forms of suppression, (by either a light machine gun, or by close precision engagement) as well as being able to project high explosives (HE) is all fairly fundamental and well understood. The benefits of training and equipping the multiple headquarters as a target find/sniper team are likewise obvious and achievable with current common equipment types.

The need to lighten and manage the infantryman's load is based around the fundamentals of the patrol mission that envisages and allows for each Soldier being recovered to a point where he can securely administer himself from equipment and personal effects held by the unit. The idea that he has to carry everything he might ever need, everywhere he goes, is simply ludicrous and removed from operational reality. The use of simulated ammunition natures being carried on all training would also help replicate real operational loads, and promote rational approaches to load carrying.

Unit organization is also addressed as part of PBI. A subunit contains an HQ and three-to-five multiples. In each subunit, one multiple may be scaled with support weapons teams, as in 60mm mortars and Light Forces Guided Weapons, dependant on threat and ROE.

The unit acts as a clearinghouse for support, planning and C3I (command, control, communications, intelligence), employing an HQ team. The difference between this and conventional concepts is that formation level assets would provide combat service support and indirect fire. Why not?

As already conceded, the PBI Soldier will be a different from the majority of men that currently occupy posts in conventional infantry units. Currently, dependant on order of battle, some infantry units have as much as 39 percent of their manpower in combat service and support (CSS) and non-directly engaged roles, such as assault pioneer and mortar platoons. Essentially what this suggests is that those from other arms could man 39 percent of some infantry units or vice-versa. Why go to the expense time and trouble to train a PB infantry man, only for him to arrive in a unit to be a driver, signaler or, God forbid, a mess waiter!

The personnel selection criteria, already outlined for PBI, suggests that not everyone can be or stay a PB infantryman. This doesn't mean that some patriotic well-meaning soul, who just happens to lack the ability to be PBI, cannot usefully serve his country in support of them, by serving in specialist units that provide CSS and fire support to deployed PB-type formations.

Also key is the concept of "bottom up" training. A true PB-based unit would actually have little in the way of tactical training manuals or pamphlets, since the unit itself would develop its own TTPs in line with doctrine and constantly reviewed central guidance. For example, a multiple commander would tell an NCO to develop a method of conducting a vehicle checkpoint (VCP), with between two-to-five teams in a multiple. The NCO would then present the problem to the men and all would contribute with ideas. He might even review previous relevant techniques, recorded in the unit-training library and/or held on electronic media. A technique would then be formulated, and demonstrated to the officer responsible, who may have given the same training task to several multiples. Each technique would be checked against doctrine, such as the core functions to see if the approaching car was:

a) Detected or found;
b) Brought to a safe halt or fixed;
c) Struck, as in the driver and vehicle were identified, etc.

All techniques would be demonstrated, critiqued, refined and

Tech Sergeant Andy Dunaway, USAF

A Soldier with the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, radios information on the movement of Iraqi civilians as fellow Soldiers and Marines search for insurgents near the Syrian border.

recorded, so as to present the best possible raft of solutions. Critique and observation by all ranks would also characterize all debrief both in training and operations.

Central to such concepts is the Soldier's belief in ownership of what he is being asked to do. Nothing is more demoralizing to an infantryman than being given tactical doctrine that he does not believe in, or has no faith in. The often-expressed belief that you "can't argue tactics" is symptomatic of the desire to remove tactical decision making from the Soldier. If you can't argue tactics, or at the very least constructively discuss them, then Soldiering is simply the product of arbitrary opinion, masquerading as a profession. Tactical discussion is often glibly denigrated as being "combat boot lacing" or "below my pay grade." This is a strange approach when the fate of modern armies may well be decided by the actions of platoons or similar groupings.

Experience shows that most negative reaction to concepts such as PBI is largely based on two basic beliefs.

The first is that the majority of Soldiers are too stupid to understand what some believe to be a complex idea, and the second is that any entertaining of such an alternative doctrine would fatally undermine current concepts.

First, the idea is probably not complex. It is fundamentally simple and logical, as is 90 percent of real world infantry work once broken down into its component parts. It is only the layers of process that we insist on adding that make it appear complex. Stripped of its comic book mystique, sniping is a fundamentally simple skill; however arcane its exponents wish it to appear. It can also be taught and applied simply, and thorough practice and experience will almost always lead to a useful degree of skill. Someone unable to master its most basic knowledge and application probably has no place in an infantry unit. The absolute enemy of PBI is process, as expressed in the proliferation of procedure and drill. The aim of process and drill is to reduce judgement because judgement allows for error. The aim of PB

is to require simple and rapid decisions at the lowest level.

Second, considering an alternative should not be considered a heresy. Since when was the acme of any profession slavishly adhering to what was written in the manual? The enemy of innovation is complacency or the inability to admit that better ways might or do exist. It may be that those better ways are impossible to implement because of the added priority that is given to such concepts as tradition, class or social structure and even cost. Cost, in particular, is a strong driver and in the current procurement climate, making things cheaper is as bad as making them more expensive. For example, PB doctrine is based on using purely digitally encrypted voice only communication, with or without separate handheld military GPS. In armies wedded to digitized net-centric concepts, instead of human-centric concepts, this is instantly seen as a bad thing. Anything cheap is instantly suspect. Bizarrely, we live in a world that shows that civilian specification sleeping bags are cheaper, lighter and superior to most military ones, and probably have a unit cost of less than

that of a mortar bomb. Yet the argument against equipping infantrymen with state-of-the-art equipment and clothing is always argued on grounds of cost.

None of what has gone before suggests that the unthinkable should not be thought, or that the irrelevances and complexities of current systems need to be acknowledged, even if they cannot be changed.

It is all too easy to say that some officers and NCOs are often so convinced of their prejudices that no amount of evidence will change their minds. In truth, some considerable parts of such evidence are lacking and could only be arrived at by truly objective trials and experimentation, but why change when there is no need to?

Whether or not there is a need is clearly open to debate. Concepts such as distributed operations will make some form of PBI type training essential, if it is not to be the sole preserve of Special Forces and thus of limited utility. It was identified as far back as 1945 that the infantry needed and required men of above average intelligence and determination, but the vested interests inherent in most armies have never let it happen.

Fundamentally, this article is not about advocating change (despite the language used). It is about advocating ideas and concepts that might lead to greater understanding. This is a subtle but critical difference. While it is entirely possible to try or even implement the ideas discussed here, it is also recognized that they would be fiercely resisted for some of the reasons already outlined.

As conceded at the start, PBI is not original. Much of it is already done, and well understood, though not in the context of what is advocated. It is entirely possible that, because of the emphasis given to non-operational drivers, PBI may have no discernable merit but there may be merit in someone asking, "what is this PBI stuff and how does it work?"

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TF 1-21 INFANTRY APPLIES THE NINE PRINCIPLES OF WAR IN KIRKUK

CAPTAIN JEREMIAH CORDOVANO

The city of Kirkuk sits at the base of the Zagros Mountain range, 350 meters above sea level, and 230 kilometers north of Baghdad in the predominantly Kurdish region of Iraq. Kirkuk is the largest city in one of Iraq's most oil-producing areas. Oil pipelines run from Kirkuk to the coastal cities of Tripoli in Lebanon and Yamurtalik in Turkey. These pipelines constitute an estimated 40 percent of all the oil in Iraq. It is an ancient city with ruins as old as 3,000 years and historical monuments and tombs that date back to biblical times. The city is comprised of four different ethnicities and three religions. Arabs, Kurds, Turkoman and Assyrian Christians make up this ethnic cauldron. All of these groups lay claim to Kirkuk in some fashion or another.

The Arabs are relatively the newest members to the area, with the majority of them (some 200,000) being emplaced there by Sadaam Hussein's regime in the 1980s and 1990s during his movement to "arabize" the region. Up until this last century, the city of Kirkuk was one of the central cities of Kurdistan, which has not been recognized as a country since World War II. The Kurds would like nothing more than to reinstate Kurdistan as a nation, with Kirkuk as their capitol city. During Sadaam's "arabization," many Kurds were displaced from their homes in Kirkuk and, since the fall of Sadaam's regime, have begun to settle back in the region and reclaim their homes. The Turkoman have lived in the city of Kirkuk since it was a part of the Ottoman Empire. The Assyrians have inhabited the region since the days of the biblical prophets Daniel and Hosea. All but the Assyrians claim predominance over the city, and all have been willing to fight for this oil-rich city in some way or another.

In late January 2004, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 25th Infantry Division deployed from Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to Kirkuk to relieve the 173rd Airborne Brigade out of Vincenza, Italy. Task Force 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry (Gimlets) was given control of the volatile city of Kirkuk in February 2004. Its main

Sergeant April L. Johnson

Soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (Light) pull security at a polling site in Kirkuk, Iraq, as election workers distribute voting materials January 27, 2005.

focus was to find and destroy enemy terrorist cells and insurgents and rebuild the civil infrastructure through various civil-military and stability and support operations (SASO).

On January 30, 2005, the country of Iraq held both provincial and national elections to emplace a freely-elected democratic government into power. At the time, I was serving as the scout platoon leader for 1-21 IN. For over a year, our brigade controlled the ethnically diverse, oil-rich city of Kirkuk. While the 2nd BCT controlled the outer regions of the city, the Gimlets were directly responsible for all civil and military operations within the city. Due to its ethnic diversity, Kirkuk is widely considered not only a possible civil war flashpoint between Kurds and Arabs, but also a smaller example of Iraq as a whole due to its volatility.

With this as the backdrop, Task Force 1-21 IN was charged with securing the city of roughly one million residents by preventing anti-Iraqi forces' (AIF) attacks on the 110 polling sites throughout Kirkuk to allow maximum participation by the local Iraqi populace. The Gimlets' planning and execution were a

textbook application on how to soundly use the nine principles of war, while continuing to intertwine those operations under a SASO umbrella. By correctly striking this balance, TF 1-21 IN was able to prepare for and secure all of the polling sites in the city throughout the election period and allow the locals to feel safe to participate in the elections.

For 12 months, the Gimlets rebuilt key infrastructure in the city, quelled the insurgency, and kept the city relatively safe compared to some of the other major cities within Iraq. We trained the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) for over a year, providing the Iraqis with equipment and instruction in everything from TCPs (traffic control points), to patrolling and room-clearing, to sensitive site exploitation (SSE). Throughout our year in Iraq, we steadily increased the number of patrols we conducted with the ISF, eventually culminating in 100-percent joint patrols. This not only increased their confidence level and training, but it also increased our confidence in the ISF's abilities. It was tough at times to instill discipline, professionalism, and accountability in the ISF, but all of our hard work had not only the immediate payoff of being able to use the ISF effectively for the elections, but also an ultimate payoff of the eventual U.S. troop drawdown. After the Transition of Authority in late May of 2004, U.S. forces, Iraqis, and AIF were all focused on the January elections that were going to emplace a provincial Iraqi government. In early December 2004, the 2nd BCT was told that its deployment to Iraq was to be extended through the January 30 elections in Iraq, and Kirkuk would continue to be the main focus for the brigade and Task Force 1-21 IN.

In December and January, leading up to the elections, there was a considerable increase in the number of attacks, both on the coalition and on the civilian populace. The terrorist cells in the city, which included members of Al-Qaeda and Ansar al Islam, were intent on disrupting U.S. operations and, more importantly, breaking the resolve and national will of the Iraqi people. The AIF attempted to discourage voters from going to the polls by making them feel insecure in the weeks leading up to the elections.

With an increase in AIF activity came an increase in intelligence gathering (both human intelligence and other) which subsequently increased the number of patrols and raids that we conducted. With the help of the Special Forces and various Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) elements, we detained many individuals in the weeks, days, and even nights leading up to January 30.

Roughly one month out, plans started to become solidified on how the Gimlets were going to secure the more than 100 polling sites and allow a little less than a million people to vote in relative safety. This plan became known as Operation Gimlet Huria (which means freedom in Arabic). On the coalition side, TF 1-21 IN was enhanced with two mechanized company elements, as well as the equivalent of an engineer company. On the Iraqi side, Operation Gimlet Huria would involve all seven police stations inside the city, along with the Emergency Services Unit, the Police Academy, the Traffic Police and Highway Patrol, two Iraqi Army companies, as well as the SMT (SWAT-type police element) and the Scorpion Platoon (Iraqi Army special operations unit). In total, TF 1-21 IN had more than 2,000 U.S. and ISF Soldiers under its control.

The Gimlets had to walk a very fine line, as it was charged with keeping the elections safe and under control, while ensuring that the ISF play a large role in the planning and execution of the operation to bolster the population's confidence in their new federal and local government. TF 1-21 IN did an amazing job maintaining the election as a joint nation-building stability and support operation by involving the local government and the ISF. This election, with the entire world watching and success being of the utmost political importance, could have easily been transitioned back to a strictly military combat operation. In trying to maintain this balance, the Gimlets successfully used the nine principles of war in planning for this operation. Due to the multi-national nature of this operation, it was imperative that the plan stayed as simple as possible. The TF commander came up with eight key tasks he wanted accomplished in a relatively simple four-phase operation. The timeline, stand-alone graphics, and multiple meetings and rehearsals ensured the plan was understood across the board and instilled confidence in the executors of that plan at every level.

During the planning and rehearsal phase of the operation, the objective and end state were very clear to all: "Polling and registrations sites in Kirkuk are secured throughout the elections period from AIF attacks and locals feel safe to participate in elections." This very distinct, clear objective was the foundation for the operation and was repeated and known to every U.S. Soldier, police officer, and Iraqi Army soldier taking part in the operation. This message was also broadcast over local TV, radio, and newspapers. There was no doubt in anyone's mind what the ISF or coalition forces' mission was leading

Sergeant April L. Johnson

Soldiers with the 25th Infantry Division's Task Force 1-21 Infantry provide security outside a polling site during elections in Kirkuk January 30, 2005.

TF 1-21 Soldiers pull security in Kirkuk as election voting materials are distributed to polling sites January 27, 2005.

up to, on, and directly after January 30, 2005.

On election day, it would have been very easy to be defensive and reactive to AIF attacks. However, the 2nd BCT and TF 1-21 IN leaned forward and dictated the nature of the city and the elections which caused the enemy to change their plans and react to what we were doing. We did this in a couple of different ways: First, we halted all vehicular traffic three days before the elections, thus significantly minimizing the threat of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Second, we acted decisively on any and all intelligence we had on cells or insurgent personnel in the city which disrupted their planning, resourcing, and execution abilities. To reduce the enemy's reaction time to our offensive, we executed most of our raids days and even hours before the elections were to be underway.

Operating in conjunction with ISF, Engineers, Aviation, Civil Affairs, Special Operations units, and attached mechanized companies allowed the Gimlets to mass the effects of its combat power in both time and space. In the ultimate team concept, we used over 2,000 people in both their traditional and nontraditional roles to accomplish the mission. The enemy was no match for that amount of combat power.

Although the Gimlets did maximize its combat power, they also had to analyze the situation and determine where they could assume prudent risk. We knew that U.S. forces could not cover all 110 polling sites, so the TF 1-21 IN staff did a calculated analysis of the enemy and the terrain to determine where our forces could be best used. U.S. forces were set up in strategic locations where they could mass and react quickly to given situations. After

living and working in that city for a year, we knew through pattern analysis where the most likely points of attack would be. This was not only based on history of attacks, but also on good avenues of approach, ethnic diversification in the neighborhood, and the economic level of the neighborhood.

We decreased the enemy's ability to maneuver by not allowing any vehicular traffic in the city during the elections, setting up more than 100 ISF-run TCPs, blocking roads, and having checkpoints at each polling location to search for suicide bombers or other weapons. We increased our ability to maneuver effectively by emplacing units and elements that had both mounted and dismounted routes to polling sites as well as preplanned reinforcement and casualty evacuation routes. Communication was another way in which we used the principle of maneuver. The U.S. forces were not only able to talk to each other, but they were also given police radios so that coalition interpreters, down to the platoon level, could communicate with the ISF. This gave us immediate knowledge of the happenings in the AO throughout the elections.

Unity of command with so many different elements could have become extremely difficult; however, the Gimlets were very clear from the beginning who was to be in charge of the various sectors and responsibilities. All units, both coalition and ISF, were controlled out of the Joint Operations Center which was located at the main police station. The city's police chief, Iraqi Army battalion commander, TF 1-21 IN commander, and overall elections officials were all located in that one spot to ensure that communication between the different elements would not be an issue. In each sector of the city, a U.S. company commander was put in charge of all ISF in his area, and they reported directly to

the coalition forces. Cell phones, interpreters, Motorola radios, and ASIPs (Advanced SINCGARS Improvement Program radios) were heavily used to communicate throughout the day.

TF 1-21 IN secured the elections sites and the force by using more than 500 hedgehogs and 800 rolls of concertina wire, as well as engineer-emplaced barriers on a third of the polling sites as protection from VBIEDs and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). Each polling site had at least a squad of ISF securing it. Also aiding in the security of the city were attack aviation assets and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

As we found through the various raids leading up to the elections, the enemy was preparing to use suicide bombs and VBIEDs to attack polling locations. The enemy was surprised by the fact that we halted vehicular traffic inside the city and had so many barriers, roadblocks, and checkpoints emplaced throughout the city. This greatly cut down on his ability to attack. Waiting until the night before to conduct many of our raids on AIF also surprised the enemy. When he went to bed the night before the elections, the enemy most likely assumed that he was in good position to attack the following day, not realizing that we were hours away from detaining him. The other factors that contributed to our surprise were the speed of our reaction times and patrols, our information superiority, and our relatively balanced security throughout the AO.

With the planning and coordination phase complete, January 30 arrived and it was time to see if the proper application of the nine principles of war to this operation would lead to the successful execution.

My role in the elections was to be the TF quick reaction force (QRF) with planning priorities being the evacuation of any coalition casualties and the reinforcement of the companies throughout the city. For me to be able to accomplish my mission effectively, I had to not only know exactly where all 110

polling sites were in the city, but I also had to know which routes I could take through the roughly 100 TCPs and various blocked roads. In the weeks leading up to the election, my platoon conducted numerous mounted and dismounted patrols, conducting route and fixed site reconnaissance so that we would know exactly how we could reinforce a polling site. This included notes and sketches on each polling site to determine height, building construction, and placement, as well as the best avenues of approach into a sector and to the polling location. To do this, we used a combination of satellite imagery, Falconview, and aviation photography to construct our plan of attack.

At approximately 0700 on January 30, two loud explosions rocked the city. Two mortars, fired minutes apart, landed just south of the coalition airbase in the southwest of the city. Polling sites were to be open from 0700 to 1700. By 1000 that day, hardly anyone had voted. The two explosions and inherent fear of attack caused many would-be voters to stay inside. As the day went along and no other reports of attacks or explosions could be heard, the citizens of Kirkuk showed their confidence in the ISF and their desire to vote in a free democratic election as they began to flood the polling sites. By noon, some polling sites had lines more than a block long.

At 1400, shots rang out from an AK-47 on a rooftop 200 meters from the south of a

polling cite aimed at the Iraqi people waiting in line. Four people were wounded in that attack. The Iraqis in that line did not run back to their homes in fear. Instead, they showed amazing resolve and stood tall in that line, determined to vote, and confident that the ISF and coalition forces would continue to protect them.

That attack ended up being the only major attack that day in the city of Kirkuk. Thankfully, for my part as the QRF, I was never called on to perform casualty evacuation or needed to reinforce polling sites or elements in contact. The 2nd BCT and, specifically, TF 1-21 IN came up with a simple, solid, and well-thought out plan that satisfied the nine principles of war while maintaining a SASO role. Thanks to TF 1-21 IN, the Iraqi people in Kirkuk took their first step toward democracy, and the local government and ISF's confidence and citizens' trust in them were significantly strengthened due to this operation.

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
Training Notes

Training the Iraqi Army:

AN LNO SHARES HIS EXPERIENCES WITH THE 205TH 'TIGERS'

CAPTAIN BRIAN M. DUCOTE

While assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, I served as the 205th Iraqi Army (IA) liaison officer (LNO) for Task Force 2nd Battalion, 2nd Infantry Regiment in Muqdadiyah, Iraq, from May 1, 2004 until February 15, 2005. Although I have learned a lot from serving in other more traditional assignments, none were as rewarding from a leadership perspective.

Forward Operating Base (FOB) Normandy in Muqdadiyah is located about 60 miles northeast of Baghdad and about 100 miles from Fallujah. When Task Force 2-2 first arrived at FOB Normandy in April 2004, the 205th Iraqi Army Battalion was undermanned, under resourced, and moderately trained — just what one would expect from a newly-formed unit in constant combat. To set the conditions for positive growth within the 205th IA Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Newell made two critical personnel moves. First, the TF 2-2 S3 sergeant major (Command Sergeant Major Darrin J. Bohn) was assigned exclusively to the IA cell. As a veteran of several armed conflicts including Operation Enduring Freedom, and as a former member of the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, CSM Bohn brought a tremendous amount of training and operational experience to our IA team. Since neither CSM Bohn nor I had conflicting duty assignments, we could focus all our efforts entirely on the IA. Second, the IA battalion commander was arrested for a litany of charges, including stealing pay from his soldiers. Selected to take his place was a young, inspirational IA S2 (Captain Thear Ishmael Abid) who instantaneously altered the command climate of the unit for the better.

Following both of these changes, CSM Bohn and I assessed the Iraqi unit's current status and established the road ahead for what would become one of the most capable Iraqi Army battalions in the country. Essentially, the majority of our efforts were focused on recruiting, resourcing, and training. All three tasks occurred simultaneously with varying levels of success; however, each was equally important to reaching our commander's desired end state: a competent Iraqi Army force capable of securing its area of operations with minimal U.S. support.

Recruiting quality soldiers into the 205th IA involved several steps: critically analyzing the troops available, instituting stringent accountability procedures, relieving those who failed to serve, and then finally recruiting new soldiers to fill personnel gaps.

Courtesy photos

By May 15, 2004, newly-promoted LTC Thear worked directly with U.S. forces as the proverbial honest broker who would guide us through the mire of deceit and corruption to truly determine the IA troops available. Most IA officers had other part-time jobs and were rarely seen around the IA compound unless it was pay day. Accountability rosters were not only outdated, but also grossly inflated in an attempt to receive more pay than the unit was authorized. Furthermore, no one had yet implemented any recognizable accountability procedures for soldiers, so they, too, were often missing for weeks at a time.

The most effective tool to immediately determine an accurate troop strength was a rotation of every soldier through the headquarters to sign for his monthly pay. This immediately provided us with an accurate personnel accountability status. Furthermore, while LTC Thear determined his unit's exact strength, his soldiers could see that he was the new face of the Iraqi Army battalion. This effort to establish 100-percent accountability gave LTC Thear instant legitimacy and acceptance. To further reinforce his authority, we gave him the ability to provide additional pay to those soldiers who consistently performed well and were present for duty. Furthermore, we also enabled him to repay soldiers who had unjustly lost pay from the previous regime.

Once we understood what troops were available, we also instituted more stringent accountability procedures. We found a computer competent Iraqi soldier and made him the first member of LTC Thear's staff, the S1. Captain Mohammed had never served in the military before, but he possessed extraordinary staff skills that would greatly enhance the 205th Iraqi Army Battalion's efficiency. By May 2004, CPT Mohammed instituted a daily accountability report that was sent via runner to the headquarters. He often personally verified the reports and demanded that the satellite companies provided accurate information. Although soldiers were only expected to work every other day due to transportation requirements, each company was expected to submit duty rosters that showed by name the status of each soldier. Another tool CPT Mohammed instituted to ensure accountability was the recall formation. During various times of the day, each company was required to conduct a muster formation and report the results to CPT Mohammed or his designated representative.

At this point, LTC Thear used his updated accountability rosters to relieve those who either did not want to belong to his battalion or were AWOL. By June 1, 2004, two weeks from the initial accountability manifest, the 205th had scrutinized its personnel strength and had an accurate idea of not only who was assigned to the unit, but also where the unit needed additional personnel.

Additional Iraqi Army recruitment occurred several times throughout our deployment. In May 2004, we used this process to address critical shortages. In September 2004, we expanded the IA battalion by one company. Finally, the addition of specialty platoons in December 2004 created another need for more personnel. Each time, we refined the procedure and allowed the IA battalion to execute more and more of the recruitment process. As a result of the positive reputation of the 205th Iraqi Army in September 2004, IA leaders eventually had more than 2,500 volunteers to fill 140 positions.

The recruitment process consisted of six stages:

An Iraqi Army candidate executes as many sit-ups as possible during his entrance physical fitness test.

recommendations from local tribal leaders, a physical aptitude test, a medical screening, a board interview, a limited background check, and finally a civil leader overview and approval board. The process was intentionally complex to create a system of checks and balances to avoid rampant "tribalism," which is a common practice among the Arab culture that gives preferential treatment to those in your tribe.

To give everyone a limited part of the recruitment process, we requested local sheik leaders to provide names of young, smart, motivated, and fit men to become a part of the 205th Iraqi Army team. These men arrived at the 205th IA headquarters where the battalion staff created an application packet for them. This packet would accompany each applicant throughout his evaluation. The physical fitness test included push-up, sit-up, pull-up, and running events. Since most Iraqis did not have suitable running shoes or enough stamina to run long distances, the running event was limited to 200-meter wind sprints. After the physical evaluation, the applicant was marched over to a medical station where a qualified IA doctor conducted a cursory screening and asked a series of questions regarding his health. After this station, the applicant appeared in front of a board consisting of 205th IA officers. The board asked each applicant why he wished to belong to the IA and what he believed he could contribute to the team. They then collected the packets from the applicant as they departed the interview. Each applicant's packet contained the results recorded for each station. In addition, it contained administrative data that IA leaders could use to investigate the background of each individual. Using existing IA soldiers as references, leaders would ask about the applicant's family and general behavior. After the leaders created a final list of potential or recommended

candidates, they submitted this list for review and approval by a board of civil leaders who had an interest in the Iraqi Army operating in the region. This was a critical step to the recruitment process. First, it ensured that Iraqi Army leaders understood that their positions were accountable to civil officials. In a country where power is everything, this was a blatant attempt to instill in IA leaders a sense of selfless service to their country and people, not to each other. Second, this final step allowed civil leaders to provide not only input and a third perspective, but also ownership of their most powerful security force. The entire recruitment process was very time consuming and complex; however, the careful and deliberate selection process paid dividends later.

As the Iraqi battalion was manned, it required an increasingly high amount of equipment and other resources. In May 2004, IA soldiers wore partial and torn uniforms from a variety of sources. Only about 60 percent of the soldiers had working weapons, and crew-served systems were almost nonexistent. Soldiers who were lucky enough to possess weapons had less than 10 rounds in their magazines. During the colder months of the previous year, soldiers wore warm clothes from home, making it difficult to differentiate IA soldiers from civilians. The entire 205th IA Battalion had two vehicles and no communication equipment to coordinate with each other or their higher headquarters. Of the four command posts and five external checkpoints, only the headquarters contained adequate force protection material around it. Under LTC Thear's leadership, the men were more motivated and inspired; however, without physical evidence of progress in the form of equipment and construction, many IA soldiers would eventually have lost hope and quit.

The first major purchase we made on June 1, 2004, was a contract to renovate the IA headquarters building on FOB Normandy. This began to instill a sense of order and pride within the officers and subsequently the men they led. Furthermore, since the renovated buildings were on FOB Normandy, it also allowed U.S. forces to begin forging a partnership with the 205th IA

Battalion that would ultimately result in a lasting friendship. (Some would argue that it is no coincidence that the 205th IA Battalion was renamed the 2-2 IA Battalion, which was also the name of our U.S. task force).

In addition to renovating the headquarters building, we simultaneously reconstructed and enhanced security checkpoints. According to LTC Thear, insurgents or smugglers could easily bypass every major IA security point in the vicinity of Muqdadiya and Dali Abas. To prevent this, three additional checkpoints were constructed in June 2004. Furthermore, since attacks on local Iraqi security forces were increasing, we desperately needed additional force protection material and adequate positions. Thus, we initiated a gradual but effective process to bolster each checkpoint based on a standard we created in conjunction with IA leaders. By November 2004, IA soldiers had metal towers, generators, and more than 50 HESCO barriers at each checkpoint. Furthermore, the amount of seized contraband and weapons increased significantly after the proper emplacement of each checkpoint.

To address the critical weapon and ammunition shortage, we initiated a local weapons buy-back program for "almost new" items in August 2004. U.S. forces and IA leaders purchased more than 200 working Soviet rifles (AK-47s) and 15 automatic machine guns (PKMs — Machine gun Kalashnikov Modernized) to arm the 205th IA Battalion. Since FOB Normandy was a former military base, the U.S. IA cell also recovered heavy automatic weapons (DsHKAs). We hired a local weapons expert to service each system, and we used hundreds of unusable weapons for spare parts. Furthermore, we also devised a "chain teach" instruction for IA soldiers on proper weapons maintenance. By October 2004, every IA soldier had a weapon, and every checkpoint had at least two automatic systems.

Since a lot of new IA equipment was on backorder through U.S. acquisition channels, we also purchased clothing items through local suppliers. Until official items arrived, we purchased uniforms, boots, hats, belts, and even arm bands in June of 2004. Furthermore, we bought IA patches, cloth rank, name tags, and "Iraqi Army" patches for every soldier. As a result, we noticed a powerful and immediate sense of pride and increased discipline within the 205th IA.

Although we used short-term fixes initially to address critical resourcing shortages, perhaps the most effective, long-term solution occurred simultaneously. While the U.S. training cell initially acquired almost all items through U.S. acquisition channels, we also assisted LTC Thear in writing the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to provide equipment as well. Building this relationship between LTC Thear and the MOD proved extremely beneficial. By August 2004, the MOD provided the 205th IA with not only body armor, cold weather gear, new uniforms and boots, but also vehicles and PKMs that provided a significant firepower advantage for the battalion.

As equipment began to arrive from both the MOD and U.S. acquisition channels, we realized the need for property accountability. In September 2004, we

The author, Captain Brian Ducote, works with civilian Iraqi contractors.

Although purchased equipment was often civilian gear, it provided uniformity and increased morale.

encouraged LTC Thear to select a 205th IA Battalion S4. He chose Captain Mofak, who made immeasurable progress in accounting for equipment arriving in overwhelming numbers. Although he accounted for all items on a old paper ledger and in pencil, he maintained accurate numbers which allowed him to formulate future requests from the MOD. With every resourcing accomplishment, we ensured CPT Mofak (an Iraqi face) was present. Based on the U.S. hand receipt (DA Form 3161), we developed an Arabic form to sign down equipment. By October of 2004, CPT Mofak completed the "back-signing" process for the entire 205th IA and could account for every serial-numbered item — not only equipment from the arms room but also materiel issued to the IA soldiers. This greatly assisted the U.S. training cell in developing an accurate IA property book that U.S. soldiers could use to spot-check accountability.

As the 205th IA received critical supplies and equipment, the U.S. training cell continued a parallel construction and renovation effort. By January 2005, we'd spent more than $2 million on FOB Normandy to renovate a tactical operations center, four company headquarters, four complete barracks buildings for the entire battalion, a training academy, an Iraqi cafeteria that provided three meals a day, and even a maintenance facility for their fleet of 50 vehicles. This logistical victory ultimately allowed LTC Thear to centralize

his unit onto FOB Normandy and significantly increased his ability to conduct operations in his region.

In April of 2004, the 205th IA Battalion conducted no independent missions or patrols due to their lack of equipment and training. It provided somewhat adequate force protection at each of its headquarters and it also manned five checkpoints with varying levels of proficiency. Most the IA soldiers believed that their duties and responsibilities only included force protection and that it was our responsibility to capture or destroy insurgents. This rationale, in addition to a lack of resources, is why IA soldiers often ran from enemy contact. To combat this mentality, we realized that we had to train the IA while simultaneously providing adequate resources.

In June 2004, when extensive resource requirements existed, the U.S. training cell prioritized the funds available to address the most critical needs first. In addition to addressing the aforementioned critical supply issues, we also initially used the bulk of the funds to establish a hasty training facility. This money allowed us to not only establish the training camp, but also provide food and water for soldiers who were attending the two-week course. The receipt of critical supplies and concurrent training of the Iraqi soldiers set the conditions for an exceptional amount of progress.

In April of 2004, the resident SF team

had initiated a successful training program for a small number of IA soldiers. However, due to limited personnel and conflicting mission priorities, the team found it difficult to extend this program to the remainder of the 205th IA.

Applying input from the SF team and analyzing the current training status of the Iraqi soldiers, our IA cell devised a simple training plan to address the unit's obvious weaknesses. Using the tool known as the Eight-Step Training Model (See Figure 1), we developed, resourced, and initiated a training plan by June 2004. The overall concept was to develop a training facility with a capacity of 100 Iraqi Army soldiers.

Two platoons at a time were soon rotating through the 205th IA Basic Training Academy. We created a program that lasted for 16 days and focused our efforts on training critical individual and squad tasks like basic rifle marksmanship, individual movement techniques, and the squad attack. We also incorporated the SF team into the training concept where they trained designated "critical skills," such as basic rifle marksmanship. During this "critical skills" training, we intentionally kept the student-to-cadre ratio extremely low to ensure each IA soldier received quality instruction from the SF experts. During the two weeks of training, Iraqi soldiers slept in four cloth tents and ate from a makeshift kitchen. The two-week program also included physical fitness sessions each morning and classes and exercises throughout the day. Since our interpreters at the training camp couldn't always translate well, the U.S. training cell found that practical exercises, simple statements, and plastic army men got our message across extremely effectively.

When the Iraqi training center expanded to two platoons, the U.S. training cell grew to include two E6s (Staff Sergeants Raymond Wray and Heath McLaughlin) and one E7 (Sergeant First Class Luis Aguilar) to execute this two-week training curriculum. The NCOs spent long hours at this camp nestled in the foothills near the Diyala River. Their dedication to the program allowed it to flourish and maintain the highest standards. These exceptional trainers remained with the IA training cell as it expanded. Over time, these professional U.S. Soldiers would witness

PLAN	TRAIN LEADERS	RECON	ISSUE OPORD	REHEARSE	EXECUTE	AAR	RETRAIN
❑ Identify higher's specified and implied guidance. ❑Assess units strengths and weaknesses. ❑ Consult doctrinal references. ❑ Establish training objectives. ❑ Identify trainers and resources.	❑ Train leaders first. ❑ Focus on basic doctrine and standards. ❑ Classroom instruction, written tests, performance tests. ❑ On site certification.	❑ Recon training site. ❑ Leaders conduct terrain walk. ❑ Identify problem areas. ❑ Develop common vision between leaders and instructors	❑ Five paragraph OPORD. ❑ Risk assessment. ❑ Execution checklist or synch matrix. ❑ Consolidated timeline with suspense's.	❑ Leaders and OCs. ❑ Sand Table. ❑ TEWT. ❑ Reduced force. ❑ Attachments. ❑ Commo plan.	❑ Pre Combat Checks. ❑ Focus on doctrine, basics, and standards. ❑ Coach frequently. ❑ Develop teamwork. ❑ Increase complexity. ❑ Realistic training. ❑Medium to capture data and lessons learned.	❑ Review training objectives. ❑ Establish what happened. ❑ Establish why it happened. ❑ Focus on how to fix. ❑ Identify tasks that must be retrained.	❑ Focus on the fixes. ❑ Train to standard. ❑ Input for next training cycle.
Publish WARNO 1		Publish WARNO 2	OPORD	FRAGO 1.		FRAGO 2	

Figure 1 - Eight-Step Training Model

the training center evolve from some cloth tents by the river into a 10-classroom renovated complex complete with computers, projectors, desks, and barracks.

Like any other job, being a part of the U.S. training cell had advantages and disadvantages. Our days were filled with long work hours during which we dealt with some below-average Iraqi Army soldiers. We also dealt firsthand with corruption in the Iraqi Army ranks and frequently encountered Iraqi soldiers who were dissatisfied with promotion, taskings, and especially pay. The U.S. training cell could rarely resolve such issues. However, we became experts at focusing these young soldiers on the tasks at hand and reassuring them that their patience would pay off in the long run. The advantages of working as a member of the U.S. training cell far outweighed any negative experiences. Never have we met a group of people who responded so well to genuine and positive leadership. Iraqis are looking for leaders to coach, mentor, and develop them. As they realized that our training cell sincerely cared about their well-being, they responded tremendously. They often put forth an effort that rivaled that of American Soldiers. Starting with little equipment and a

small base of knowledge, these soldiers committed themselves to learning their profession. The U.S. training cell was often humbled by their dedication.

In addition to the Iraqi Army soldiers, the U.S. training cell also recruited a group of former, professional Iraqi soldiers to attend the course. Our training cell later used these civilians to form a cadre responsible for training the Iraqi Army. These civilians not only attended the training camp, but they also shadowed the U.S. training cell for more than a month. After they were individually certified, they were then authorized to teach classes previously instructed by our cadre.

Despite initial difficulties with students giving the proper respect to the civilian instructors, this competent, well-trained cadre proved to be an extremely effective tool. Most Iraqi soldiers responded better to instruction from fellow Iraqis. In addition, the soldiers seemed to grasp concepts quicker when they didn't need an interpreter. By November 2004, this cadre doubled in size to 24 and assumed responsibility for training the entire 32nd IA Brigade in addition to the 205th IA Battalion.

The development of the IA had to be a "total process" in which everyone had an Iraqi counterpart. In conjunction with this developmental progression, IA platoons that graduated from the training course would then be assigned to U.S. units to conduct joint patrols. Task Force 2-2 as a whole could then coach, mentor, and develop the IA on all echelons. To reinforce this total process mentality, our cell consistently informed U.S. company commanders in Task Force 2-2 about the IA's progress. Our cell invited all leaders to visit the training facility as much as possible. We provided detailed updates during training meetings, battle

An Iraqi Army squad leader explains to Sergeant First Class Luis Aguilar how he will react to contact using plastic army soldiers.

update briefs, and even during command and staff meetings. Furthermore, LTC Newell placed a greater emphasis on U.S. commanders to forge mentoring relationships with the IA. This type of command emphasis essentially meant that each IA leader had a U.S. counterpart. To set the example, LTC Newell invited LTC Thear to attend weekly meetings. Furthermore, they met almost daily to discuss issues facing the IA battalion and recommend solutions. Very few aspects of Task Force 2-2's battle rhythm did not include a component of the 205th IA. Training the IA was

During the advanced training, IA soldiers react to contact.

no longer the sole responsibility of the U.S. training cell, but rather the responsibility of every Soldier.

U.S. Soldiers at every level often found that it was easy to set an example for the Iraqi soldiers who had only known fear, chaos, and retribution. Basic leadership that we often take for granted was exceptionally effective on the 205th IA. Molding the Iraqis into professional soldiers was simple: be a professional soldier and they will follow your example out of sheer admiration. When we earned their trust and respect with sincere intentions, most Americans in Task Force 2-2 discovered that the seemingly mistrusting Iraqis were actually a fiercely loyal and impressionable people. Within months, the Iraqi soldiers would not only defeat stereotypes, but also prove to their American brethren that they are capable of securing and defending their country.

Based on the "total process" of training the Iraqi Army, we initiated a staff mentoring program in September 2004. The overall concept was divided into two parts. First, there was a series of group instruction classes that included duties and responsibilities of the staff officer, the purpose of the staff, and how the staff works together. The staff attended a two-week training seminar to learn the role of each staff officer, conduct practical exercises, and most importantly build a team. Second, we introduced each American staff officer to his Iraqi counterpart. Each week, they

met for an hour or more to discuss various means to accomplish their staff responsibilities. Although missions and operational tempo often interfered with training, this program provided the Iraqi staff officers with at least a basic idea of their responsibilities. Concurrent with this program was the purchase of more than 15 internet-enabled computer systems with printers. A civilian instructor trained the IA staff officers on basic computer skills; furthermore, the IA officers were also tasked to create automated systems that would facilitate their respective jobs.

By October of 2004, the basic and staff training programs were in full swing. However, based on a continual assessment provided by U.S. commanders, the U.S. training cell recognized the need for an advanced training program. According to feedback derived from U.S. leaders and Soldiers, the IA seemed better trained but unrehearsed under fire. As a result, we developed another course to maintain critical skills and address outlined weaknesses. U.S. commanders provided this feedback when almost every IA platoon had completed the initial basic training course. As a result, the U.S. training cell initiated the advanced training program and started to cycle one IA platoon at a time through the new course. Since the advanced training incorporated more complex tasks, we reduced the number of IA soldiers attending the course to no more than one platoon at a time. In the advanced

training program, we created several live-fire exercises designed to challenge IA platoon leaders and review critical skills. Furthermore, the SF team provided one-on-one training on reflexive fire techniques at the range. These exercises not only provided realistic battlefield scenarios for the IA to negotiate, but also dramatically increased confidence in each IA soldier. When they graduated from the advanced training program, soldiers felt certain about their weapon and their comrades.

Operation Iron Fist

Towards the end of Task Force 2-2's deployment, the Iraqi Army had undergone a constant and evolving process of recruiting, resourcing, and training. On November 12, 2004, most of Task Force 2-2 was recovering from an arduous road march and preparing for future operations in Fallujah, Iraq. Since I was assigned as the IA LNO, my chain of command insisted that I remain at FOB Normandy along with C/2-2 IN in Muqdadiyah to continue the critical mission of training the 205th IA. Although I felt left behind in one sense, I embraced the opportunity to assess the progress and capabilities of the 205th IA since the inception and implementation of the aforementioned training programs. I requested permission from Captain Adam Reese, the C/2-2 IN commander, to shadow his unit on every joint IA patrol that it conducted. Since we were using the majority of TF 2-2's combat power in Fallujah, my request coincided with an increased employment of the 205th IA in conjunction with U.S. forces. I observed the Iraqi soldiers' actions and their practical application of concepts learned from the training programs. Furthermore, I noted weaknesses which I used to subsequently adjust the current instructional curriculum to establish more beneficial training objectives.

After several joint checkpoint operations and presence patrols, I concluded that the soldiers of the 205th IA had come a long way in regard to their overall professionalism, discipline, and pride.

However, during Operation Iron Fist, I got an extremely revealing snapshot of the Iraqi Army's tactical progress.

The initial report of insurgent activity that would initiate Operation Iron Fist came through the Iraqi-led Joint Coordination Center (JCC) in the city of Muqdadiyah at 0730 November 12, 2004. Iraqi civilians claimed that insurgents were patrolling the streets to demonstrate their ability to operate freely despite coalition presence. Our S2 suggested that insurgents knew our weakened disposition and were taking advantage of a potentially slower response time. The acting TF 2-2 commander immediately notified the C/2-2 commander to prepare his quick reaction force (QRF) for employment once more details of the report became available. In addition, I was notified to request a section of IA soldiers from the 205th to accompany our patrol.

As I moved into the 205th IA TOC, I noticed an Iraqi officer on duty receiving a radio transmission from the JCC. The officer had a soldier transcribe critical details, and then the lieutenant quickly produced a standardized report for the 205th IA commander. Just a few months prior, I usually received a report from coalition liaisons in the JCC and then attempted to pull together an Iraqi patrol. As I watched various Iraqi leaders do their part, I realized that there was no need to tell them what to do or how to do it. I remember standing in the doorway with a strange feeling in my heart. For the first time, I felt like I was in their way.

I moved outside to see young Iraqi NCOs bustling around vehicles that had DshKAs on homemade iron mounts bolted securely to the trucks. I watched privates check their ammunition supply and fasten body armor onto their comrades. Drivers were under the hoods of two vehicles conducting final pre-combat checks, using a checklist created by their platoon leader. Unlike earlier missions, when unorganized groups of Iraqi soldiers with incomplete equipment loads would pile into a limited number of vehicles, these soldiers were performing their respective duties as competent, well-trained professionals. Perhaps the most striking difference from the previous 10 months was that I could recognize their faces. In the past, Iraqi soldiers wore garments to hide their identity. However, they now carried an aura of dignity and pride that replaced the cloth around their heads.

As we linked up with C/2-2, the Iraqi Army trucks were full. Soldiers were eating some last minute chow and drinking water from their canteens. As I moved over to the coalition HMMWVs, I immediately noticed a similar scene. There were U.S. Soldiers laid back eating MREs and drinking bottled water to hydrate. I remember reflecting back to the days when getting an Iraqi to drink water was a difficult task. They always seemed to prefer "chi" which is a shot glass of very sweet and potent tea. It only took a few days in the training camp for them all to discover that hydration was the key to success. After the C/2-2 commander provided the Iraqi PL with an operational update, the patrol began moving into the city of Muqdadiyah.

When we approached the area where the JCC had reported 10-12 armed insurgents, an eerie feeling came over me. I noticed that the streets were empty, and the Iraqi soldiers began to scan their assigned sectors more vigorously. They seemed more focused and professional. Even according to the Iraqi civilians, the men in the 205th IA carried themselves differently. During Operation Iron Fist, their appearance and weapons posture affirmed that they meant business.

When we crossed the first major intersection along our route, our patrol was engaged with small arms fire. I remember the Iraqi and American Soldiers firing back with intensity and aggressiveness. The days when IA soldiers ran from an armed enemy were over. In fact, not only did they respond violently, but they also maintained contact with the enemy. Even though insurgents fired an RPG round at their vehicle, the IA soldiers dismounted quickly and stacked on a nearby wall. The IA drivers immediately spread out the main gun systems along critical avenues of approach and successfully secured the rear of the coalition convoy. From my position, I could see American and Iraqi forces attempting to suppress the enemy on several rooftops while their respective soldiers maneuvered towards the objective. I moved with an American squad to join an Iraqi team who pinpointed the location of at least one insurgent. As we moved across the street, IA soldiers with automatic weapons pulled security. While I was on the far side of the objective building, I noticed two cabs about 150 meters away. The vehicles came to a screeching halt and out jumped five armed men in civilian clothes. Although they did not seem hostile, I raised my weapon and let the situation develop. As the armed men ran towards us, they began yelling in Arabic. I could not believe my eyes. They were reaching into their pockets and pinning on Iraqi Army badges. They were IA soldiers on their way to work who had stopped to help their comrades fight.

The insurgent forces quickly withdrew under pressure after engaging a highly aggressive and lethal coalition team. Friendly forces never captured or destroyed any enemy combatants during Operation Iron Fist. However, every American Soldier did capture something else. We all returned from the mission with our Iraqi comrades with a refreshed, hopeful outlook for the people of Iraq. Our hard work paid off ... and so will theirs.

I have never had a more positive leadership experience than working alongside the 205th Iraqi Army "Tigers." They left an indelible impression upon me and all of Task Force 2-2. Although we recruited, equipped, and trained their force, perhaps the most powerful enabler we provided was simply faith in their abilities. I still keep in contact with some of the Iraqi soldiers via e-mail and they still thank us for all our efforts; however, I often wonder who learned more. We may have initially provided the IA all the soldiers, facilities, and basic tactical knowledge, but they ultimately provided the one thing we could never give or build them ... belief in their fellow citizens, their country, and their future.

Captain Brian M. Ducote was commissioned in 1999 from the U.S. Military Academy. He served with the 1st Infantry Division in Vilseck, Germany until June 2005. While overseas, CPT Ducote was deployed to both Kosovo and Iraq with Task Force 2-2, 3rd Brigade Combat Team. After completing the Infantry Captains Career Course, he will PCS to Fort Riley, Kansas, and be assigned to 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 1st ID.

Courtesy photos

The Italian Ranger training includes an amphibious phase where candidates learn how to move and survive in a water environment.

Italian Rangers have participated in many recent operations including those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Italian Rangers Link Up with U.S. Counterparts

From September 18-25, 2005, the commander of the 4th Italian Ranger Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Caruso, and S3, Captain Massimiliano Bar, visited the Ranger Training Brigade and the headquarters of the 75th Ranger Regiment.

The purpose of the visit was to collect information about the training conducted at the U.S. Ranger School, establish a close link with the U.S. Army's 75th Ranger Regiment, and to plan cross-training with this Special Operations unit.

The 4th Italian Ranger Regiment was first born as "Monte Cervino" Battalion (the italo-swiss Matterhorn mountain, named from the Italian side) at the beginning of World War I during the winter of 1915. It fought at Passo della Borcola, on the Pasubio, on Monte Vodice, and on Monte Grappa.

Disbanded in 1919, it was brought back again in 1940 as a skiing battalion and fought in Greece and Albania during World War II. In November 1941, it fought on the Russian front, where it was heavily involved in hard and long fighting.

The constitution of the Alpini Airborne Platoons occurred in 1952, and the constitution of the Alpini Airborne Company occurred in 1964. In 1996 this company became the Ranger

The last 16 weeks of the Italian Ranger course focuses on mountain training.

Battalion Monte Cervino, and it finally became the 4th Ranger Regiment in September 2004.

In the last 20 years, the 4th Ranger Regiment has participated in many worldwide operations including those in Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The 4th Italian Ranger Regiment is prepared to plan and conduct direct actions and carry out light infantry tasks at strategic and operational levels.

Today, they are accomplishing missions in Nasiriya and Baghdad, Iraq, and in Kabul and Herat, Afghanistan.

The headquarters of the Italian Ranger Regiment is located in Bolzano, in northeast Italy near one the most beautiful mountain landscape of the world: the Dolomite mountains. The Italian Rangers use this terrain to train themselves to move, fight, and survive in the hardest environment for soldiers: the mountains.

Gaining the Italian Ranger qualification is a long and hard process. First, volunteers have to become military parachutists. After the four-week school, Rangers next spend 17 weeks in Bolzano for basic training.

During this phase, instructors focus their attention on the physical and psychological attitude of the soldiers. Physical training, land navigation, shooting and patrol procedures are the minimum capabilities that they have to learn.

After this phase, candidates attend the Ranger course (six weeks), which is the most important part of the training. They have to prepare and conduct at least four missions (direct actions), and Ranger instructors evaluate candidates as patrol leader, medic, RTO, and weapons squad leader.

The amphibious course is the phase that follows the Ranger course. In these two weeks, candidates learn how to move and survive in a water environment.

The last 16 weeks of the course are focused on mountain training. During the first eight weeks of this last phase, Rangers learn what it means to move, survive, and fight in a mountain environment. The purpose of this phase is to teach them the different techniques for climbing with weapons, patrol equipment and in all weather conditions. Many hours are spent teaching knots and rappelling methods. At the end of the course, the best qualified candidates will be sent to Italian Alpini Military School to become climbing instructors. Within the unit, more than 50 Rangers are climbing instructors.

From January to March, Rangers attend the skiing phase. This is usually the more dangerous part of the course because candidates have to patrol in a winter environment on skis carrying a lot of weight.

At the end of this long training period, candidates move to one of the two Ranger companies. But soldiers' training is not finished; usually in a year they will conduct at least four live-fire exercises by day and night at platoon level, two live-fire exercises by day and night at company level, one live-fire exercise by day and night at battalion level as well as air assault exercises with army aviation.

Only few selected soldiers are gathered in the "Recon platoon" where they specialize their training with the free fall jump course.

This platoon conducts tactical reconnaissance, surveillance and direct action operations in support of the Ranger Regiment, pathfinder operations, mark drop zones and conduct operations with other SOF.

Currently, the 4th Italian Ranger Regiment has two officers and two NCOs who graduated from the U.S. Ranger School. One of this two NCOs, Master Sergeant Luca Bertozzo is also qualified as an instructor for the U.S. school and spent last year working as an instructor in the school's mountain phase.

The 4th Italian Ranger Regiment commander hopes to continue sending others officers or NCOs to the U.S. Ranger course and to improve cross-training between the Italian Rangers and 75th Ranger Regiment.


*Italian Ranger volunteers must first become military parachutists.*

WEAPONS CORNER
A Closer Look at Grenades

This issue's Weapons Corner features a few of the more common Soviet and former Warsaw Pact antipersonnel and anti-vehicular grenades that were sold to the Saddamist regime in large numbers. These may be employed as booby traps, rigged adjacent to trails and walkways with trip wires, or they may be thrown or dropped from buildings by terrorists. As improvised explosive devices, the grenades may be enclosed in a glass jar or lump of mud and left by a roadside, to be detonated when the outer covering is shattered by a vehicle's wheels or when a Soldier or civilian kicks what appears to be an innocuous mudball. The latter technique was successfully employed against U.S. forces in Vietnam, and today's terrorist has learned what worked for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces.

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
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M 52 P3

Homemade Hand Grenade

RPG 42

M 75

Book Reviews

Not a Good Day to Die, The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda. **By Sean Naylor. The Berkley Publishing Group, New York, 377 pages, $25.95.** Reviewed by Major Keith Everett, U.S. Army Reserve.

Sean Naylor was a senior writer for the *Army Times* when he worked as one of only eight embedded journalists for Operation Anaconda on March 2, 2002, in Afghanistan. The author, with no direct military experience, has a solid base of journalistic deployments to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Croatia covering military operations, and his writing experience for the *Times* since 1990 prepared him for covering Afghanistan operations. Naylor uses his close observations of the planning, preparation and execution of the Shahikot Valley mission, coupled with personal interviews, sometimes painfully candid, of many of the key personnel directly involved in Anaconda.

Operation Anaconda mistakes start with the decision in Washington to limit troop levels to prevent political fallout. This decision is viewed as a mistake by many of the Soldiers interviewed, as it artificially limits the number of troops for the mission instead of first asking the field commanders what the requirements are for the mission. The first question politicians must ask is what are the field operational requirements to accomplish the desired mission objectives. The troop-level decision resulted in a follow-on mistake of relying on aircraft to provide almost all of the heavy firepower for infantry support. Cutting field artillery and reduced mortar support were some of the effects of the troop-level limit. General Tommy Franks is given full credit for approving the decision not to take artillery into the fight. The reason given for not taking field artillery is the idea of not wanting to appear as the Soviets in leveling towns with field artillery. Instead of putting the burden of prudent use of force on the field commander, the valuable tool of artillery support was taken out of his hands. The lack of artillery and sufficient mortars was compensated by usually unnecessary heroics as infantrymen tried to fill the gaps in firepower with what they had available. As usual with operational decisions made at the strategic level, reality is not fully considered, and the ground-level troops take the brunt of the mistakes in killed and wounded.

The idea that technology can work against you is amply illustrated as General Franks was the approving authority for the Apaches to strike any target in the villages. Since Franks was in Florida, this is incredible micromanagement unheard of since Johnson made troop deployment decisions from the White House. Again, the hands of Major General Franklin Hagenbeck, the 10th Mountain Division commander in charge of all U.S. forces in Anaconda, and his planners are tied. Video teleconference technology made micromanaging by long distance possible.

Throwing in Navy SEAL units into land warfare was a baffling decision to add a little more jointness to an already unwieldy cross attachment of companies and battalions to form the task organization for Operation Anaconda. A highlight of the operation, the successes of the classified Advance Force Operations unit, a select Special Operations group of 13 elite Soldiers from the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's Seal Team Six are retold in detail. This Advance Force Operations unit saves the operation from catastrophic failure before the missions even start by capturing key Al Qaida positions in the Shahikot Valley. The critical successes of the Advance Force Operations unit gives one the idea more of these types of units would help strengthen the Special Forces community. The U.S. Central Command also failed to create a clear chain of command in this joint operation, resulting in the fumbling of the disseminating of intelligence to the units needing it most in a timely manner and in communicating combat developments so better decisions are made.

Major General Warren Edwards, the deputy commanding general for operations at the Coalition Forces Land Component Command was quoted as saying, "We are not going to repeat the mistakes of the Soviets. We are not going to go in with large conventional forces." The decision not to send in adequate forces to seal the border passes allowing untold numbers of the enemy an escape route to Pakistan will be second-guessed as long as the Operation Anaconda results are debated. MG Edwards is also quoted as saying, "There was a constant disconnect between mission and assets allowed to be available to do the mission."

Intelligence indicated a high level enemy official was in the Shahikot Valley. Since the indications were not specific, one can only guess if it was Osama Bin Ladin in the valley. In retrospect, a combination of Special Forces and conventional forces would have more effectively sealed off escape routes for the most notorious terrorist killer of our time, if the indicators were correct. In late January 2002, General Franks had relied on Afghan forces backed up by Special Forces without conventional forces to block the escape routes from Tora Bora. Although Tora Bora was taken, and it is believed Osama Bin Laden and hundreds of Al Qaida forces escaped, most likely to hiding places in Pakistan.

Other issues include the failure of the Afghan forces to complete their mission, the use of inadequate maps and the cutting of the Air Force air planner staff should receive more study. Why were 1:100,000 maps used instead of 1:50,000 maps, as requested by many of the ground troops? As Lieutenant Colonel Louis Bochain points out in his interview with the author, why was an Air Defense company included in the troop count against an enemy with no air force? Including LTC Bochain's nine-man air planner staff could have easily added an increased air capability. The Special Forces-led Afghan forces had no chance against a well-prepared, dug-in enemy.

The lack of air strike support for the main effort of the operation pushed the Afghan forces out of the operation before they were even able to get into position.

Naylor does a great service to future joint operations with his candid telling of the Anaconda story. The author collected fresh interviews and edited little of the harsh assessments needed to improve operations. The operation plan was a product of negotiation and compromise on many issues, which the command should not have allowed. *Not a Good Day to Die* should be required reading for any operational planner. Planning for joint operations is hard enough without the continuing turf wars between the services. Operation Anaconda is additional proof of the pressing need for continued refinement of how we operate jointly. Perhaps only by merging many of the service capabilities will the U.S. develop true jointness. The hodgepodge approach to put units together for specific operations works only because of our technological edge. Future joint operations are better served by merging capabilities in peacetime, so operations work smoother in wartime. Naylor brings a focus on this issue throughout his exciting account. At times, it is hard not to get angry with some of the decisions made. This account should be required reading for politicians on how their decisions can directly affect military operations. If nothing else is learned, a politician could take away the idea that mission requirements dictate the number of troops needed for an operation, not a politically desired end-state. Regardless of the troop makeup of future joint operations, Sean Naylor should be a requirement to get the most out of the story by both documenting the situation and creating the best learning opportunity for U.S. forces.

Franco: Soldier, Commander and Dictator. **By Geoffrey Jensen. Potomac Books: Dulles, Virginia. Online at www.potomacbooksinc.com. 135 pages, 2005.** Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy.

Potomac Books, which was previously Brassey's Books, is a premier publisher of military titles. Their exquisite military profile series has more than two dozen biographies of the world's most influential military leaders from ancient times to the present. Every year, expect three to four new and fresh biographies that offer both the novice and specialists a quick understanding of the major military leaders of all time. This year the biography of Francisco Franco, Spain's Generalissimo is featured, written by a leading authority on the Spanish military — Geoffrey Jensen.

Like many dictators, Franco is controversial, and there is a tendency to ignore his military thinking and focus on his repressive rule of Spain that lasted over four decades. Jensen was masterful in showing readers how Franco's experiences fighting insurgencies in Morocco shaped his strategic thinking and compelled him to gain insight and experience on the operational arts of war. By the time Franco arrived in Morocco in 1912, the Spanish had attempted to dominate the country for 50 years. He was a young infantry lieutenant who was surrounded by Spanish officers mired in an insurgency that the Spanish military academies hardly prepared them for. The state of Spanish arms in Morocco was reduced to a force demoralized by officers inattentive and outright neglectful to the needs of their troops. The Moroccans knew they were outgunned by modern Spanish weapons and used hit and run tactics. Franco was among the first officers to realize that conventional warfare tactics were useless and developed new techniques including long-range heavy mortar attacks on mountain strongholds. He would evolve an appreciation for the deliberate planning of combined arms, logistical planning and use of airpower. However, Franco never appreciated *blitzkrieg* tactics or the maximizing the use of armor.

Franco was an *africanista*, a label applied to Spanish officers who believed in their divine imperial mission in Morocco. He engaged Riffian tribesmen along the Melila coast, and despite making gains, civil authority in Madrid cut the ability of the Spanish colonial forces to press the attack. As a first lieutenant, he refined his skills of careful planning, logistics and lines of fortification. To say

he won many battles would be understatement, but he did appreciate the sweeping tactics of his adversary and the use of country and urban warfare tactics to undermine a standing force. He would put these skills to use in the bloody Spanish Civil War that preceded World War II. He left Morocco a major and returned in 1920 as second in command of a new force *Tercio de Extrajenos* referred simply as *La Legion* there he would see ferocious guerillas fighting in Morocco. What is fascinating is the use of the hamlet philosophy made famous in Vietnam in this war. By the mid-1920s, the Spanish adopted a new policy of garrisoning forces in major Moroccan towns like Ceuta, Larache and Tetuan; it is also during this time that Franco opposed his superiors, particularly those who did not maintain a full commitment to the Moroccan war.

The book details his rise with Spain's conservative politicians and his reluctance to become embroiled in military coups until finally being enticed by the fear of a leftist takeover. Franco would be dispatched to Morocco in 1934 to protect him from political intrigue and violence that included the sacking of churches and the symbols of power in Spain. He would return with his army of Africa and use his guerillas tactics in the service what would become known as the Nationalists against the Republicans. Franco would rise to become Spain's absolute dictator with ties to Hitler and Mussolini and would remain standing until his death in 1975. The book details how Franco used the church, fascists and the army to maintain power. This is an excellent book for those with an interest in Spain, insurgency tactics, and North African (Moroccan) military history. In 1956, when Morocco attained independence its first order of business was to end Spanish rule over the Western Sahara. The aftermath of the withdrawal of the Spanish from the Western Sahara persists today. The book does contain one slight error in the photo section, it shows Franco with an unidentified Arab shaking hands of officers lined up in the airport; the unidentified Arab leader with the sunglasses is Saudi Arabia's second King Saud Bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud (1953-1964).

Sergeant Jose Rivera (right), Private First Class Richard Robinson (center) and Specialist Diego Cruz wait for the signal to enter a house during a patrol in Bayji, Iraq. The Soldiers are assigned to the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division.

SUBMIT AN ARTICLE TO *INFANTRY*

Articles can be submitted via e-mail to rowanm@ benning.army.mil or mailed to P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. If you mail the manuscript, it is also helpful to include an electronic copy as well as a printed copy.

Topics for articles include information on organization, weapons, equipment, tactics, techniques, and lessons learned. We also include relevant historical articles with emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past. The best advice we can give is to write and tell us about your article idea, explaining your intended theme, scope, and organization. We'll let you know whether we would be interested in printing the proposed article, and we will give you any further guidance you may need.

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* Hands on Everything: Company XOs in Iraq

* Lessons Learned from a Support Platoon Leader in Iraq

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